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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court of the State of Delaware is widely considered 
one of the most prominent authorities on corporate law in the country. 
Accordingly, the decisions of this court play an important role in shaping 
the development of corporate law and best business practices in 
corporate America.  The Delaware Supreme Court is also well-known 
for its unanimity in deciding issues of corporate law.  Not surprising, the 
most controversial of its decisions are often the few non-unanimous 
ones.  In 2003, such a decision was issued in the case of Omnicare, Inc. 
v. NCS Healthcare, Inc.1  Addressing fiduciary duty and corporate
governance issues in the mergers and acquisitions context, the Omnicare 
decision has been described as the “Court’s most important decision in a 
generation”2 and “among the most controversial corporate cases” 
decided by the court in the past twenty years.3  Delaware Supreme Court 
Chief Justice Myron Steele ranked Omnicare among the four “most 
memorable or most notable” decisions written during his tenure.4 
The specific issue confronting the court in Omnicare was the use of 
deal protection devices in the proposed merger of NCS Healthcare, Inc. 
and Genesis Health Ventures, Inc.  Prior to Omnicare, the Delaware 
courts had addressed the validity of, and appropriate standard of judicial 
review for, deal protection devices and other defensive measures in 
either the hostile takeover context5 or the change-in-control context.6  
The NCS-Genesis merger, however, presented a different and unusual 
situation in that the use of deal protection devices occurred in a friendly, 
non-change-in-control transaction.  The Delaware Court of Chancery 
rejected claims that approval of the merger’s deal protection devices 
violated the NCS board’s fiduciary duties, but a sharply divided 
Delaware Supreme Court reversed.  Applying enhanced judicial scrutiny 
1.  Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003).
2.  Wayne O. Hanewicz, Director Primacy, Omnicare, and the Function of Corporate Law, 
71 TENN. L. REV. 511, 512 (2004). 
3.  Robin Sidel, Merger Business Faces New Order with Court Ruling on “Lockups,” WALL
ST. J., Apr. 7, 2003 at C4. 
4.  Francis Pileggi, Interview with Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice Myron Steele,
DELAWARE CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LITIGATION BLOG (Dec. 28, 2009), 
http://www.delawarelitigation.com/2009/12/articles/commentary/interview-with-delaware-supreme-
court-chief-justice-myron-steele/. 
5.  See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 293 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
6.  See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del.
1986). 
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to the challenged merger provisions, the court found that the deal 
protection devices were both preclusive and coercive.  Thus, the 
provisions were invalid and unenforceable.  Further, the court held that 
this particular combination of deal protection devices rendered the 
merger an impermissible fait accompli and for that reason as well the 
merger agreement was invalid and unenforceable.  In approving a 
completely locked-up transaction that lacked a fiduciary out, the court 
held, the board had breached its fiduciary duties by restricting its ability 
to continually act in the stockholders’ best interests.  Two of the court’s 
justices strongly disagreed with these holdings, each writing a dissenting 
opinion that criticized the majority for misinterpreting Delaware case 
law to support its conclusions and setting bad precedent.  The dissenting 
justices voiced their hope that going forward the decision would be 
applied in a very limited manner.7 
Criticism of the Omnicare decision has not been limited to the 
dissenting justices.  The majority’s opinion has been labeled by scholars, 
practitioners, and other members of the judiciary as a troubling decision 
– contrary to both precedent and common sense.8  In fact, almost all of
the scholarship discussing Omnicare has described the decision in some 
manner as one of “bad law, bad economics, and bad policy.”9  Predicting 
that Omnicare would “[f]undamentally [a]lter the [m]erger [i]ndustry,”10 
prompted some to even call for its reversal.11 
Despite the criticism and opposition to the majority’s opinion, this 
controversial decision has played an important role over the past decade 
in shaping the development of mergers and acquisitions, in particular 
7.  See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 946 (Del. 2003) (Veasey,
C.J., dissenting). 
8.  See E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened in Delaware
Corporate Law and Governance from 1992-2004?  A Retrospective on Some Key Developments, 
153 U. PA. L. REV. 1399, 1458 (2005) (“In 2003, the Supreme Court faced the deal protection 
question in an unusual and highly controversial case: Omnicare v. NCS Healthcare.”); Sean J. 
Griffith, The Costs and Benefits of Precommitment: An Appraisal of Omnicare v. NCS Healthcare, 
29 J. CORP. L. 569, 623 (2004); Hanewicz, supra note 2, at 512 (“Omnicare has been called the 
Delaware Supreme Court’s most important decision in a generation, and it is as controversial as it is 
confusing . . . . “) (internal citations omitted); Sidel, supra note 3, at C4; Pileggi, supra note 4; 
Steven Davidoff, The Long Slow Death of Omnicare, DEALBOOK, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2008, 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2008/08/28/the-long-slow-death-of-omnicare [hereinafter Davidoff, 
Long Slow Death] (“The Delaware Supreme Court’s Omnicare ruling was arguably the most 
controversial mergers and acquisitions decision of this decade.”). 
9.  Griffith, supra note 8, at 623.
10.  Brian C. Smith, Comment, Changing the Deal: How Omnicare v. NCS Healthcare
Threatens to Fundamentally Alter the Merger Industry, 73 MISS. L.J. 983, 983 (2004). 
11.  See, e.g., Thanos Panagopoulos, Thinking Inside the Box: Analyzing Judicial Scrutiny of
Deal Protection Devices in Delaware, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 437, 474 (2006). 
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director decision-making.  In many ways Omnicare is not unlike other 
controversial decisions that have come out of the Delaware Supreme 
Court, most prominently, Smith v. Van Gorkom.12  In each of these 
famously controversial decisions, the Delaware court used its decision to 
signal to corporate America about how boards of directors should 
function.  For example, at the time that the court’s decision in Van 
Gorkom was issued, the reaction from the corporate law community was 
one of strong opposition.13  Indeed, shortly after Van Gorkom, the 
Delaware legislature enacted Section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General 
Corporation Law to specifically address the outcome in that case.14  
Today, however, Van Gorkom is viewed very differently.  As 
summarized by Professor Therese Maynard: “To show how time heals 
all wounds, many practicing M&A lawyers today recommend that board 
members read the facts of the [Van Gorkom] decision carefully before 
embarking on any M&A transaction . . . . because it provides a modern 
case study of how not to execute an M&A transaction.”15  
Notwithstanding the criticism of the court’s decision, Van Gorkom 
contributed to dramatically changing corporate America’s business 
practices and the decision-making process expected of boards of 
directors.  This article concludes that the same can be said about 
Omnicare. 
In the years following Omnicare many questioned “whether 
Omnicare [is] a normatively ‘good’ rule, but also whether the current 
understanding of the rule and rationale in Omnicare will continue to be 
‘good’ law.”16 Now, with the benefit of a decade of hindsight, the 
decision’s impact, both practically and normatively, can be seen.  With 
that in mind, the intent of this article is to provide a comprehensive 
discussion of Omnicare’s place in corporate law.  While almost all prior 
12.  Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) overruled by Gantler v. Stephens, 965
A.2d 695 (Del. 2009). 
13.  See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40
BUS. LAW. 1437, 1455 (1985) (criticizing the court’s emphasis on board process and referring to the 
case as “one of the worst decisions in the history”); Bayless Manning, Reflections and Practical 
Tips on Life in the Boardroom After Van Gorkom, 41 BUS. LAW. 1, 1 (1985) (“The Delaware 
Supreme Court in Van Gorkom exploded a bomb. [Moreover, the] corporate bar generally views the 
decision as atrocious.”). 
14.  See THERESE H. MAYNARD, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND 
PROBLEMS 486 (2d ed. 2009) (describing the legislative history of Section 102(b)(7) and its 
adoption in response to Van Gorkom). 
15.  Id. at 484 (emphasis in original).
16.  Daniel C. Davis, Omnicare v. NCS Healthcare: A Critical Appraisal, 4 BERKELEY BUS.
L.J. 177, 180 (2007). 
4
Akron Law Review, Vol. 47 [2014], Iss. 3, Art. 4
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol47/iss3/4
2014] “BAD LAW, BAD ECONOMICS AND BAD POLICY” 757 
scholarship surrounding Omnicare has been of a critical nature,17 this 
article takes a different perspective of the decision, discussing the 
broader normative contributions Omnicare has made to mergers and 
acquisitions.  In many ways Omnicare changed the expectations of 
today’s boards of directors, contributing to improving corporate 
governance and maximizing stockholder value.18  While this article 
concludes that Omnicare positively contributed to reshaping merger and 
acquisition conduct, it also asks whether, in the end, these changes are 
efficient.  In particular, do the gains to stockholders resulting from 
Omnicare’s changes to director decision-making outweigh the costs to 
stockholders that result from its requirement of increased judicial 
scrutiny and ban on precommitment strategies? 
This article begins by briefly discussing the factual background of 
the Omnicare decision and the majority’s opinion.  Second, this article 
analyzes the criticism that followed, which generally falls into two broad 
categories: the doctrinal shortcomings in the majority’s reasoning and 
the negative practical implications of banning precommitment strategies.  
Third, this article briefly explores whether the concerns about 
Omnicare’s impact on merger and acquisition activity came to fruition in 
the ten years since the decision was issued, concluding that many did 
not.  This article also reviews post-Omnicare case law noting that 
subsequent decisions of the Delaware Court of Chancery addressing 
Omnicare-based challenges have sought to avoid its application.  While 
Omnicare has not been overruled and remains good law, these decisions 
indicate a willingness of Delaware’s lower court to limit its reach.  As a 
result, the number of actual scenarios where the decision may still have a 
direct impact is small. 
Nevertheless, it would be unwise to overlook the positive aspects of 
17.  See infra Part III. But see J. Travis Laster, Omnicare’s Silver Lining, 38 J. CORP. L. 795,
796 (2013) (asserting that “Omnicare does have a silver lining”); Brian JM Quinn, Bulletproof: 
Mandatory Rules for Deal Protection, 32 J. CORP. L. 865, 866 (2007) (arguing in support of 
Omnicare’s prohibition on “bulletproof” agreements in non-Revlon transactions); Mark Lebovitch 
& Peter B. Morrison, Calling a Duck a Duck: Determining the Validity of Deal Protection 
Provisions in Merger of Equals Transactions, 2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 8-20 (2001) (asserting 
that Unocal scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review for deal protection devices in mergers of 
equals). 
18.  This discussion, of course, assumes that one accepts stockholder wealth maximization as
the goal of corporate law.  See Leo Strine, Jr., Essay, Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea that 
For-Profit Corporations Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 155 (2012) (“I simply indicate 
that the corporate law requires directors, as a matter of their duty of loyalty, to pursue a good faith 
strategy to maximize profits for the stockholders.”); Hanewicz, supra note 2, at 511 (assuming that 
the proper goal of corporate law is maximization of wealth for stockholders and noting the debate 
on this point). 
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Omnicare.  Because the vast majority of scholarship addressing this 
controversial decision has been of a critical nature, little attention has 
been given to Omnicare’s normative value.  Thus, Part V addresses 
some of the broader normative implications of Omnicare with a 
particular focus on the role the decision plays in improving corporate 
governance and increasing stockholder value.  In re-evaluating the 
decision it becomes clear that the Omnicare majority sought to improve 
corporate decision-making in one of, if not the, most important events in 
the life of a corporation – the merger.  To that end, the decision added a 
renewed and heightened focus on deal protection devices and the role of 
the board of directors in properly discharging its fiduciary duties in the 
context of negotiating, evaluating, and ultimately accepting, a merger 
proposal.  In the style characteristic of Delaware fiduciary duty case law, 
Omnicare is a normatively charged decision, providing guidance on the 
decisional process required of corporate directors.  In particular the 
majority’s decision shapes the definition and description of the roles that 
directors are expected to fill in negotiating and approving mergers, with 
a focus on deal protection devices.  Finally, Part VI of this article 
discusses whether, despite their positive impact, Omnicare’s changes to 
corporate governance are efficient ones. 
II. OMNICARE, INC. V. NCS HEALTHCARE, INC.
The late 1970s and early 1980s marked the beginning of the hostile 
takeover era in corporate America.  Commensurate with the increase in 
merger and acquisition activity was an increase in the use of deal 
protection devices.19  The traditional scheme of fiduciary duty standards 
that had been applied to friendly merger transactions became 
unworkable in the context of hostile acquisitions.  As hostile takeovers 
began to dominate the landscape of deal-making, corporate 
jurisprudence expanded to address the use of defensive tactics and deal 
protection devices.20  Beginning with Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum 
Co.21 in the mid-1980s, a string of decisions from the Delaware courts 
began to limit the use of deal protection devices in the merger context by 
applying heightened judicial scrutiny.22  In 2003, the Delaware Supreme 
Court was squarely faced with the issue of the validity of deal protection 
19.  See also John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, A Buy-Side Model of M&A Lockups:
Theory & Evidence, 53 STAN. L. REV. 307, 310 (2000). 
20.  See infra note 170 and accompanying text.
21.  Indus. Nat. Bank of R.I. v. Bennett 293 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
22.  See Panagopoulos, supra note 11, at 441; Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 8, at 1454. 
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devices and the appropriate standard of review for such devices in the 
friendly merger context. 
A. The Background Facts23 
The Omnicare decision arose out of Genesis Health Ventures, 
Inc.’s (“Genesis”) and Omnicare, Inc.’s (“Omnicare”) competing efforts 
to acquire NCS Healthcare, Inc. (“NCS”).  In late 1999, NCS was one of 
the leading independent providers of pharmacy services to long-term 
care institutions.  By 2001, however, changes in the healthcare industry 
had resulted in NCS finding itself in financial trouble24 and exploring 
strategic alternatives.  NCS initially approached Omnicare to discuss a 
possible transaction, but because all of Omnicare’s proposals involved 
acquiring NCS for a purchase price substantially lower than the face 
amount of NCS’s debt obligations they were rejected by the NCS board 
of directors.25 
During this time Genesis also became interested, submitting a 
business combination proposal to NCS.26  Based on previous experience 
with Omnicare, Genesis insisted that any potential transaction with NCS 
be completely locked up to preclude Omnicare from submitting a last-
minute bid.27  Following further negotiations with Genesis and a last-
minute acquisition proposal by Omnicare that was rejected by the NCS 
board, Genesis and NCS reached agreement on a merger of the two 
corporations.28  Both the NCS special committee and the full board of 
directors approved the Genesis merger with the deal protection devices 
that provided Genesis with deal certainty, believing that they were 
necessary to secure the best transaction available.29 
Following the announcement of the NCS-Genesis merger, 
23.  While the facts surrounding Omnicare have been described as “unique” (Omnicare, Inc.
v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 939 (Del. 2003) (Veasey, C.J., dissenting)), there was little
disagreement in either the majority opinion or the dissents regarding the factual findings of the 
Court of Chancery.  Id. at 920 (majority opinion). 
24.  Id. at 920.  The changes adversely affected NCS’s ability to collect accounts receivable
from the government and third-party providers, which, in turn, led to a drop in the market value of 
the corporation’s stock and its financial deterioration.  Id. 
25.  Id. at 921.  All of Omnicare’s offers at this time involved a pre-packaged bankruptcy sale
which would have resulted in zero recovery to NCS’s stockholders.  Id. at 921. 
26.  Id. at 922.  Unlike the Omnicare offers, Genesis’ proposal was a stock-for-stock deal that
would not involve bankruptcy.  Id. 
27.  Genesis and Omnicare had a history; they previously had been engaged in a bidding war 
for a different entity, which Genesis ultimately lost.  As a result, Genesis’ representatives made 
clear to NCS that it would not be used as a stalking horse.  Id. at 921-22. 
28.  Id. at 924-25.
29.  Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 925 (Del. 2003). 
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Omnicare submitted a superior proposal to NCS.30  As a result, the NCS 
board withdrew its recommendation to the stockholders that they vote in 
favor of the Genesis merger.31  Despite this change in recommendation, 
the NCS board was nevertheless obligated under the terms of the 
merger’s deal protection devices to submit the Genesis merger to the 
stockholders for adoption.  Omnicare and NCS stockholders each filed 
suit alleging, in pertinent part, that the NCS directors had breached their 
fiduciary duties in approving the Genesis merger agreement, specifically 
the deal protection devices.32 
The focus of the plaintiffs’ allegations (and the courts’ decisions) 
was three principal aspects of the NCS-Genesis merger.  First, NCS’s 
two largest stockholders, Jon H. Outcalt and Kevin E. Shaw, had entered 
into voting agreements with Genesis.33  Under the terms of the voting 
agreements Outcalt and Shaw agreed to vote their shares of NCS stock, 
constituting more than sixty-five percent of the voting power, in favor of 
the Genesis merger.34  Second, the merger agreement contained a “force-
the-vote” provision.  This provision required NCS’s board to submit the 
merger agreement to a vote of the stockholders regardless of whether the 
board continued to recommend adoption of the merger.35  Third, the 
merger agreement did not provide NCS with a fiduciary out to allow its 
board to terminate the transaction in the event of a superior offer without 
breaching the agreement.36  The combination of these three elements 
meant that even though the NCS board changed its recommendation 
following Omnicare’s higher bid, the Genesis merger would still be 
submitted to the NCS stockholders for adoption, which adoption was 
certain because over a majority of the voting power was already 
committed to approving the transaction under the terms of the voting 
agreements.  As a result, NCS was locked into the merger with Genesis. 
30.  Id. at 926.
31.  Id.
32.  Id. at 927; Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 809 A.2d 1163, 1165 (Del. Ch. 2002);
In re NCS Healthcare, Inc., S’holders Litig., 825 A.2d 240 (Del. Ch. 2002). 
33.  Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 926 (Del. 2003).  Outcalt and
Shaw served on the NCS board, however, they both entered into the voting agreements in their 
capacity as NCS stockholders and not in their capacity as directors or officers.  Id. 
34.  In the agreements, Outcalt and Shaw also granted Genesis an irrevocable proxy to vote
their shares.  Id. 
35.  Id. at 925.  Force-the-vote provisions are specifically permitted by Section 146 of the
Delaware General Corporation Law; see 8 Del. C. § 146. 
36.  Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 925.
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B. The Delaware Supreme Court’s Majority Decision 
In a rare 3-2 decision, the Delaware Supreme Court, on a 
consolidated appeal of the two lawsuits,37 reversed the lower court, 
holding that the NCS board had breached its fiduciary duties in 
approving the deal protection devices in the Genesis merger.38  In its 
analysis, the majority first held that the NCS directors’ approval of the 
deal protection devices was subject to enhanced scrutiny, as opposed to 
the deferential business judgment rule.39  Traditionally, Delaware courts 
applied Unocal’s enhanced scrutiny when a target corporation’s board 
takes defensive measures in response to a pending or potential hostile 
takeover.40  The Omnicare majority found that “[a] board’s decision to 
protect its decision to enter a merger agreement with defensive devices 
against uninvited competing transactions that may emerge is analogous 
to a board’s decision to protect against dangers to corporate policy and 
effectiveness when it adopts defensive measures in a hostile takeover.”41  
In the majority’s view, the “omnipresent specter” of a conflict of interest 
that arises between the board of directors and stockholders identified in 
Unocal and its progeny is also present when a board adopts defensive 
devices to protect a merger agreement, thus enhanced scrutiny is the 
37.  The Delaware Court of Chancery was presented with two separate suits challenging the
NCS-Genesis merger.  First, Omnicare filed a complaint (i) seeking to invalidate the NCS-Genesis 
merger agreement on fiduciary duty grounds, and (ii) seeking a declaratory action that the voting 
agreements entered into by Outcalt and Shaw caused their shares of stock to be automatically 
converted from high-vote Class B shares to single-vote Class A shares under the NCS certificate of 
incorporation.  Omnicare, 809 A.2d at 1165.  The Court of Chancery dismissed the breach of 
fiduciary duty claims for lacked of standing.  Id. at 1168-73, and later granted summary judgment 
against Omnicare with respect to the declaratory judgment claim.  Omnicare, 825 A.2d at, 270-75. 
 Second, a class action suit was brought by NCS stockholders challenging the merger on 
fiduciary duty grounds and requesting that the court enjoin the transaction.  In re NCS Healthcare, 
825 A.2d at 243.  The court denied the plaintiffs’ application for a preliminary injunction, finding 
that the NCS directors had acted in accordance with their fiduciary duties in seeking the best 
transaction that was reasonably available to them.  Id. at 261.  The court also found that the 
plaintiffs had failed to show that the provisions were improperly preclusive or coercive under 
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).  Id. at 261-62. 
38.  Omnicare, 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003).  The court remanded the proceedings to the
Chancery Court for entry of a preliminary injunction.  Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 822 
A.2d 397 (Del. 2002) (Order). 
39.  Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 928 (Del. 2003). 
40.  See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954-55.  Courts apply enhanced scrutiny to board decision-
making in these situations due to the target directors’ inherent conflict between their self-interest in 
maintaining their positions in the corporation, and thus adopting defensive provisions to protect 
themselves from the hostile bidder, and acting in the best interests of the corporation and its 
stockholders. 
41.  Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 932.
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proper standard of review.42 
Based on this holding, the majority applied the two-stage analysis 
set forth in Unocal (as modified in Unitrin, Inc. v. American General 
Corporation)43 to the combination of deal protection elements in the 
Genesis merger.44  First, the majority looked at whether the NCS board 
had “reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy 
and effectiveness existed.”45  The majority noted that the threat 
identified by the NCS board – the perceived threat of losing the Genesis 
transaction with no alternative deal – was a sufficient threat under 
Unocal.46 
Turning to the second stage of Unocal review, the majority 
addressed whether the deal protection devices were “reasonable in 
relation to the threat posed.”47  This analysis required the court to 
determine (i) whether the response to the threat was “coercive” or 
“preclusive”48 and (ii) whether the response was within a “range of 
reasonable responses” (or proportionate) to that threat.49  Applying this 
analysis, the majority found the deal protection elements of the Genesis 
merger to be both coercive and preclusive.  The combination of the 
voting agreements, force-the-vote provision and lack of a fiduciary out 
was coercive because it predetermined approval of the merger without 
regard to its merits.50  And while the minority NCS stockholders were 
not forced to vote for the Genesis merger, they were required to accept it 
because the transaction was a fait accompli.51  The deal structure was 
also found to be preclusive because it “made it ‘mathematically 
impossible’ and ‘realistically unattainable’” for any alternative superior 
transaction to succeed.52  Thus, the majority held, the deal protection 
42.  Id. at 930.
43.  Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995). 
44.  On appeal, the majority rejected Genesis’ argument that the voting agreements should not
be construed as deal protection devices implemented by the NCS board.  Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 
934.  The court pointed out that in the case of the Genesis merger, the voting agreements were 
“inextricably intertwined” with the rest of the defensive provisions of the merger agreement.  Id. 
45.  Id. at 935 (quoting Unocal Corp., 493 A.2d at 955).
46.  Id. at 941.
47.  Id. (citing Unocal Corp., 493 A.2d at 955).
48.  “A response is ‘coercive’ if it is aimed at forcing upon stockholders a management-
sponsored alternative to a hostile offer.”  Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 
935 (Del. 2003).  “A response is ‘preclusive’ if it deprives stockholders of the right to receive all 
tender offers or precludes a bidder for seeking control by fundamentally restricting proxy contests 
or otherwise.”  Id. 
49.  Id. at 935.
50.  Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 935-36 (Del. 2003).
51.  Id. at 936.
52.  Id.
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devices in the Genesis merger agreement were invalid under Unocal.53 
The majority alternatively held the Genesis merger agreement 
invalid and unenforceable because it failed to contain a fiduciary out 
provision.  The NCS board was required to negotiate for a fiduciary out 
in the merger agreement because, in its absence, the combination of the 
voting agreements and force-the-vote provision resulted in an invalid 
complete lock-up of the transaction.54  As the majority explained, 
“directors of a Delaware corporation have a continuing obligation to 
discharge their fiduciary responsibilities, as future circumstances 
develop, after a merger agreement is announced.”55  The NCS board 
lacked the authority to accede to Genesis’ demand that the merger be 
absolutely locked-up since it would restrict this responsibility to 
discharge its duties on a continuing basis.56  Accordingly, the 
combination of deal protection devices impermissibly locked-up the 
merger in violation of the NCS directors’ fiduciary duties and was 
invalid.57 
III. OMNICARE’S CRITICISM AND COMMENTARY
Not unlike other influential corporate law decisions, the immediate 
reaction to the Delaware Supreme Court’s opinion in Omnicare was one 
of immediate and widespread criticism.  In discussing the role that the 
Omnicare decision has had in shaping mergers and acquisitions, it is 
necessary to also analyze and evaluate the criticism and commentary 
surrounding the majority’s opinion. 
Some of the harshest criticism of Omnicare came from the two 
dissenting justices in the case.  Chief Justice Veasey wrote a dissenting 
opinion that was joined by then Justice, and subsequently Chief Justice, 
Steele, who also filed a separate dissent.  Noting that Omnicare was 
unique in that it was “a rare 3-2 split decision of the Supreme Court,”58 
the dissenting justices expressed their “regret[] that the Court is split in 
this important case,” and wrote that “[o]ne hopes that the Majority rule 
announced here – though clearly erroneous in our view – will be 
53.  Id. at 935-36.  The majority also found (without analysis) that because the deal protection
devices were preclusive and coercive they were also not a proportionate response to the perceived 
threat of losing the Genesis merger.  Id. 
54.  Id. at 938.
55.  Id.
56.  Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 938 (Del. 2003). 
57.  Id. at 939.
58.  Id. at 939, n.90 (Veasey, C.J., dissenting) (“Split decisions by this Court, especially in the
field of corporation law, are few and far between.”). 
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interpreted narrowly and will be seen as sui generis.”59 
Following in the footsteps of the dissenting justices, many 
corporate scholars and commentators quickly criticized the majority’s 
opinion based on similar objections and concerns to those expressed by 
Chief Justice Veasey and Justice Steele.  In addition, even some of the 
members of Delaware’s Court of Chancery expressed disagreement with 
the decision.60  Critics not only strongly disagree with the majority’s 
holdings but the underlying rationale as well.61  Overall, these critiques 
fall into two broad categories: (1) that the majority’s decision “rests on 
an infirm doctrinal foundation”62 and its holdings are unsupported by 
Delaware case law, and (2) that as a practical matter, the majority’s ban 
on complete lock-ups will adversely affect both targets and bidders in 
the mergers and acquisitions context and perhaps the use of 
precommitment strategies more broadly. 
A. “[A]n Infirm Doctrinal Foundation”63 
The majority’s Omnicare decision received considerable criticism 
for its misplaced reliance on Delaware case law to support its holdings. 
In particular, the dissenting justices took issue with the majority’s 
statement that Delaware jurisprudence compelled the court to invalidate 
the actions of the NCS board and its controlling stockholders.64  With 
respect to each of its holdings, the dissents asserted that the majority was 
either mistaken in its reliance on Delaware case law (e.g., the majority’s 
reliance on QVC to require a fiduciary out), improperly applied that case 
law (e.g., the majority’s application of Unocal’s preclusive/coercive and 
proportionality inquiries), and/or lacked any support in Delaware 
jurisprudence for its conclusions (e.g., the majority’s holding that a 
complete lock-up is per se invalid).  Corporate scholars and 
commentators level similar criticism against the majority’s reasoning 
59.  Id. at 946.
60.  See infra notes 117-20 and accompanying text (discussing Chancellor Strine’s criticisms
of Omnicare); see also Transcript of Oral Argument, Optima Int’l of Miami v. WCI Steel, Inc., C.A. 
No. 3833-VCL, at *127 (Del. Ch. June 27, 2008) (Vice Chancellor Lamb noting that “Omnicare is 
of questionable continuing vitality”); In re Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1016 
n.68 (Del. Ch. 2005) (then-Vice Chancellor Strine calling the decision “aberrational”). 
61.  See Hanewicz, supra note 2, at 539 (“Unfortunately, although the function of the
Omnicare ruling is defensible, the reasoning the court used to get there is again, with all due 
respect, bad.”). 
62.  Griffith, supra note 8, at 587.
63.  Id.
64.  See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 942-45 (Del. 2003) (Veasey,
C.J., dissenting). 
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while also characterizing the opinion as an improper extension of prior 
Delaware decisions.  For these reasons, as well as others, the majority’s 
holdings and underlying rationale have been described as normatively 
controversial.65 
1. The Business Judgment Rule, and Not Unocal, Was the Correct
Standard of Review 
As an initial matter, Omnicare’s dissenting justices disagreed with 
the majority’s approach of applying heightened scrutiny in its evaluation 
of the deal protection devices.66  The dissenting justices, however, were 
of the opinion that the more deferential business judgment rule was the 
correct standard of review.  As Chief Justice Veasey explained, there 
was no threat that the NCS board was acting in its own self-interested 
manner (this was a friendly, not a hostile, merger), so the deal protection 
devices were not defensive in nature and heightened scrutiny per Unocal 
was inappropriate.67  In a separate dissent, Justice Steele emphasized his 
objection to the majority’s application of Unocal.68  In his view, the 
Court of Chancery’s factual findings precluded further judicial scrutiny 
of the NCS board’s actions in negotiating and agreeing to the terms of 
the Genesis merger.69  Justice Steele stated that in his opinion, 
“Delaware law mandates deference under the business judgment rule to 
a board of directors’ decision that is free from self-interest, made with 
due care and in good faith.”70  In reviewing the actions of the NCS 
board, Justice Steele found that the decision to approve the merger 
agreement was an informed decision made by an independent committee 
and approved by the full board.71  In the absence of a breach of fiduciary 
duty, the court should defer to the board’s exercise of its managerial 
65.  See Hanewicz, supra note 2, at 556.  But see Laster, supra note 17, at 796 (asserting that
four aspects of the majority’s decision “deserve positive reinforcement”). 
66.  Somewhat ironically, the majority had agreed with the lower court that “the NCS
directors’ decision to adopt defensive devices to completely ‘lock up’ the Genesis merger mandated 
‘special scrutiny’ under the two-part test set forth in Unocal” but reached the opposite conclusion in 
applying that test.  Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 934 (emphasis in original). 
67.  Id. at 943 & n.102 (Veasey, C.J., dissenting).
68.  Id. at 947 (Steele, J., dissenting) (“The majority’s conclusion substantially departs from 
both a common sense appraisal of the contextual landscape of this case and Delaware case law 
applying the Unocal standard.”).  While Justice Steele concluded that in the absence of self-interest 
or a lack of due care the court should defer to a board’s business judgment and not second guess the 
decision to agree to the defensive provisions, he stated that even applying Unocal review he would 
reach the same conclusions as the Court of Chancery and uphold the deal protection devices.  Id. 
69.  Id. at 946-47.
70.  Id.  But see infra note 81 and accompanying text.
71.  Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 947-48 (Steele, J., dissenting). 
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power in agreeing to the deal protection devices. 
Subsequent criticism builds upon the dissenters’ objections. 
Central to this line of criticism is the majority’s conclusion underlying 
its application of Unocal that all deal protection devices are defensive in 
nature.72  The majority found the “inherent conflicts between a board’s 
interest in protecting a merger transaction it has approved” and “the 
stockholders’ statutory right to make a final decision to either approve or 
not approve the merger”73 as analogous to the “omnipresent specter” of 
conflict of interest that exists when a board adopts defensive measures in 
response to an attempted hostile acquisition.74  However, many corporate 
commentators disagree.  They argue the circumstances facing the 
boards, and the motivations of the individual directors, in Unocal and 
Omnicare were quite different.75  Unocal involved a hostile takeover 
attempt while Omnicare involved a friendly negotiated merger.  Critics 
note this important distinction because the inherent conflicts and 
entrenchment motives of the board in the former are not present to the 
same extent, if at all, in the latter.  Thus, the policy rationale for applying 
Unocal’s enhanced scrutiny to hostile takeovers is lacking in cases like 
Omnicare where the transaction is a negotiated merger.76 
Despite the criticism, it should be noted that the majority’s 
application of enhanced scrutiny under Unocal to a board’s approval of 
deal protection devices is the least controversial aspect of the opinion.  
In fact, Vice Chancellor Laster has described this holding as “the 
decision’s silver lining.”77  Pre-Omnicare, certain corporate scholars 
72.  See, e.g., Griffith, supra note 8, at 588-89 (questioning the majority’s equating of “deal
protection devices” with “defensive devices” in applying enhanced scrutiny); Smith, supra note 10, 
at 991 (“The classification of all merger lock-up measures as ‘defensive in nature’ could signal the 
death knell for the business judgment rule as it relates to mergers in the last period of play.”).  But 
see infra notes 77-81 and accompanying text. 
73.  Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 930.
74.  Id. at 932.
75.  See Hanewicz, supra note 2, at 534-35 (stating that the NCS board agreed to the deal
protection provisions to avoid losing the Genesis deal, not to avoid a threatened or pending higher, 
hostile offer, and that the “court simply ignored this distinction between Unocal and the facts before 
it”); see also Griffith, supra note 8, at 588. 
76.  See Griffith, supra note 8, at 588; Hanewicz, supra note 2, at 534-35 (asserting that the
“omnipresent specter of Unocal and its progeny is not the omnipresent specter identified by the 
Omnicare court.”); Andrew D. Arons, Comment, In Defense of Defensive Devices: How Delaware 
Discouraged Preventive Measures in Omnicare v. NCS Healthcare, 3 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 
105, 120-21 (2004). 
 Critics also attacked the majority’s reference to Time Warner in support of its application 
of Unocal to deal protection devices.  See Griffith, supra note 8, at 590.  Other Delaware case law 
has also been argued as weighing against the majority’s application of Unocal.  See id. at 590-91 
(citing to Williams v. Geier). 
77.  Laster, supra note 17, at 811. 
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advocated for the application of some form of enhanced judicial review 
to these provisions.  Most prominently, Professors John C. Coates IV 
and Guhan Subramanian took a close look at the actual impact that deal 
protection devices have on the merger process.78  In their study, 
Professors Coates and Subramanian concluded that “contrary to the 
conventional wisdom, lockups may well ‘hurt.’”79  In light of deal 
protection devices’ profound influence, the authors recommended that 
courts “not rubber-stamp lockups under the business judgment rule or 
rely on bright-line rules of thumb to approve lockups,” rather they 
should more carefully scrutinize approval of these provisions.80  
Similarly, prior Court of Chancery cases had intimated that applying an 
enhanced judicial review of these merger provisions was warranted.81  
While critics of Omnicare acknowledge that there may be such 
reasonable arguments for extending Unocal to deal protection devices,82 
they nonetheless fault the majority for its failure to provide “a reasoned 
foundation for the application of enhanced scrutiny to friendly merger 
agreements.”83  As a result, critics argue, the “application of Unocal to 
78.  Coates & Subramanian, supra note 19, at 310. 
79.  Id. at 377-78.
80.  Id. at 307 & 389-90.  In advocating for more judicial scrutiny of deal protection devices,
Professors Coates and Subramanian proposed enhanced scrutiny in the form of a Revlon-like 
analysis.  Id. at 390.  Similarly, Mark Lebovitch and Peter Morrison strongly advocated that 
enhanced scrutiny was the proper standard for judicial review of deal protection devices; however, 
asserting that Unocal was the proper analysis.  See Lebovitch & Morrison, supra note 17, at 8-20; 
see also Leo E. Strine, Jr., Categorical Confusion: Deal Protection Measures in Stock-for-Stock 
Merger Agreements, 56 BUS. LAW. 919, 929 (2001). 
81.  See, e.g., McMillan v. Intercargo Corp., 768 A.2d 492, 506 n.62 (Del. Ch. 2000) (stating
that “‘deal protection’ terms self-evidently designed to deter and make more expensive alternative 
transactions would be considered defensive and reviewed under the Unocal . . . standard”); Ace Ltd. 
v. Capital Re Corp., 747 A.2d 95, 108 (Del. Ch. 1999); Transcript of Oral Argument, Phelps Dodge
Corp. v. Cypress Amax Minerals Co., No. 17398, 1999 WL 1054255 (Del. Ch. Sept. 27, 1999) 
(implicitly endorsing enhanced scrutiny and criticizing a board’s use of a no-talk provision as 
unreasonable); Roberts v. Gen. Instrument Corp., No. 11639, 1990 WL 118356, at 1554-1555 (Del. 
Ch. Aug. 13, 1990); Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 572 A.2d 1152 (Del. 1989).  But see 
In re IXC Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., Nos. 17324, 17334, 1999 WL 1009174, at *10 (Del. Ch. 
Oct. 27, 1999) (applying the business judgment rule to a no-talk provision in a stock-for-stock 
merger and stating that “neither the termination fee, the stock option agreements nor the no-
solicitation provisions [were] defensive mechanisms instituted to respond to a perceived threat.”). 
82.  Hanewicz, supra note 2, at 535 n.166 (“This is not to say there are no reasonable
arguments for applying Unocal to deal protection measures.  I happen to believe these arguments 
are, to a large degree, incorrect.  Regardless of where one stands on the issue, the court’s failure to 
consider this question more openly is a serious shortcoming in its doctrinal analysis.”) (internal 
citations omitted). 
83.  Griffith, supra note 8, at 588; see Hanewicz, supra note 2, at 535 n.166.  But see Laster,
supra note 17, at 807-11 (“The Delaware Supreme Court also provided a coherent policy-based 
analysis for applying enhanced scrutiny under these circumstances.”). 
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the deal protection devices in Omnicare, and to deal protection devices 
generally, is deeply unsatisfactory.”84 
2. The Majority Incorrectly Applied Unocal
Even if Unocal was the proper standard by which to judge the 
actions of the NCS board, the dissenting justices – and much subsequent 
legal scholarship – assert that the majority improperly applied that 
standard.  This argument follows two separate, but related, lines.  First, 
the majority misapplied the concepts of “coercive” and “preclusive” by 
characterizing them as a threshold inquiry that preempts any 
proportionate balancing of deal protection devices.85  Second, the 
combination of deal protection devices in the Genesis merger was 
neither preclusive nor coercive, was a proportionate response to the 
threat posed, and thus, as was found by the Court of Chancery, satisfied 
scrutiny under Unocal.86 
Regarding the first point, Chief Justice Veasey argued in dissent 
that the majority’s reading of Unitrin as dictating that the concepts of 
“preclusive” and “coercive” act as a threshold analysis under Unocal’s 
enhanced scrutiny before engaging in the proportionality inquiry was 
incorrect.87  The proper inquiry, rather, should be consideration of both 
the preclusiveness/coerciveness of the provisions and their 
proportionality to the threat posed.  Refining enhanced scrutiny under 
Unocal/Unitrin, as the majority had done in its opinion, to prescribe the 
coercive and preclusive analysis as preempting the proportionality 
inquiry would result in the courts discounting the specific facts that led 
to a board’s decision.88  Indeed, that was just what the majority had 
84.  Griffith, supra note 8, at 591.
85.  See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 942-43 (Del. 2003); Arons, 
supra note 76, at 121-26 (asserting that the court misapplied the enhanced scrutiny standard); Smith, 
supra note 10, at 994. 
86.  Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 943; see Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 8, at 1459 (asserting
that even applying Unocal the board had acted reasonably and properly exercised its business 
judgment as the Chancery Court found). 
87.  See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 942-45 (Veasey, C.J., dissenting); see also Smith, supra note
10, at 994 (“This bifurcated test applied by the majority in analyzing the proportionality prong of 
Unocal is a deviation from the traditionally fact-specific body of Delaware corporate law.”); Daniel 
Vinish, Comment, The Demise of Clarity in Corporate Takeover Jurisprudence: The Omnicare v. 
NCS Healthcare Anomaly, 21 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 311, 335-44 (2006). 
88.  See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 943-45 (Veasey, C.J., dissenting); Smith, supra note 10, at
994; see also Arons, supra note 76, at 125-26 (asserting that “[t]he majority gave no justification for 
this drastic alteration of the proportionality test”); Davis, supra note 16, at 194 (criticizing the 
majority for “further refin[ing] the Unitrin analysis by specifying that the question of preclusiveness 
or coerciveness is a threshold inquiry which must be satisfied prior to considering the 
16
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done.  The majority erred, Chief Justice Veasey maintained, when it 
failed to take into account the fact that the deal protection devices were 
necessary to secure the only available deal – the Genesis deal – which 
was a reasonable and a proportionate response in relation to the threat of 
not having any possible transaction at all.89  As stated in his dissent, “In 
our view, the proportionality inquiry must account for the reality that the 
contractual measures protecting this merger agreement were necessary to 
obtain the Genesis deal.”90  Thus, the Chief Justice concluded he would 
have affirmed the judgment of the Court of Chancery that the NCS 
directors satisfied Unocal as the deal protection devices were a 
reasonable, proportionate response to the perceived threat of losing the 
Genesis transaction.91 
On the second point, the majority and dissenting justices (along 
with most critics) reach opposite conclusions as to whether the 
combination of deal protection measures was preclusive and/or coercive.  
As set forth in Unitrin, to be preclusive, an action must “deprive 
stockholders of the right to receive all tender offers or preclude a bidder 
from seeking control by fundamentally restricting proxy contests or 
otherwise.”92  But how could the deal protection devices in the NCS-
Genesis merger have been preclusive, critics ask, when they did not 
deprive NCS stockholders from receiving any subsequent bids, as 
evidenced by the later offer from Omnicare?93  As for coerciveness, 
which occurs when a response is “aimed at forcing upon shareholders a 
management-sponsored alternative to a hostile offer,”94 critics point out 
that the majority ignored an important fact – that stockholders holding a 
majority of the voting power, Outcalt and Shaw, freely supported the 
Genesis merger agreement including the deal protection devices.  Any 
‘reasonableness’ of the board’s action”).  In a recent article, Vice Chancellor Laster has disagreed 
with the dissenters’ proffered application of Unocal, explaining that “Combining the inquiries into a 
single, overarching reasonableness test would have implied that under some circumstances, a board 
could coerce a stockholder vote or preclude stockholders from having any alternative other than the 
board’s chosen transaction.”  Laster, supra note 17, at 811.  Vice Chancellor Laster tempers his 
support of the majority, however, stating that while he agrees with the doctrinal framework in the 
majority opinion, he “does not [agree] with the application of the principles to the facts.”  Id. at 818. 
89.  Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 945 (Veasey, C.J., dissenting).
90.  Id.
91.  Id. (“The Majority has not demonstrated that the director action was a disproportionate
response to the threat posed.  Indeed, it is clear to us that the board action . . . was reasonable in 
relation to the threat, by any practical yardstick.”). 
92.  Id. at 935 (majority opinion) (citing Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361,
1387-88 (Del. 1995)). 
93.  See Davis, supra note 16, at 197. 
94.  Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 935 (citing Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1387-88).
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coercion was therefore merely a result of being minority public 
stockholders in a controlled company, and not as a result of the deal 
protection devices.95  The majority was incorrect in focusing its coercion 
analysis on the fact that the public stockholders could not outvote the 
majority stockholders.  Instead, critics argue, coercion arises only when, 
as a result of inequitable, unilateral board action, stockholders are forced 
to accept a proposed transaction for reasons other than its merits.96  
Because Outcalt and Shaw – two stockholders with a combined 65 
percent of the voting power who could therefore approve the Genesis 
merger without the need for the approval of the minority stockholders – 
made an informed choice as stockholders to commit their shares of stock 
in favor of the merger, the dissents argued that any coercion that a 
minority stockholder may have felt was meaningless since there was no 
meaningful minority stockholder voting decision at issue.97 
In sum, critics assert that under the majority’s broad application of 
the preclusiveness and coerciveness inquiries, any set of deal protection 
devices that completely locked up a merger agreement would be 
improper.  This holding, in combination with the majority’s analysis of 
coercion/preclusion as a threshold inquiry (and thus a failure to even 
consider the proportionality of the provisions to the threat posed), results 
in locked-up merger agreements being per se invalid under Unocal 
regardless of how reasonable they may be under the circumstances.98  
“[T]his new rule,” Chief Justice Veasey noted in dissent, “is a judicially-
created ‘third rail’ that now becomes one of the given ‘rules of the 
game,’ to be taken into account by the negotiators and drafters of merger 
95.  See Hanewicz, supra note 2, at 541 (“It was not the deal protection measures that coerced
the public shareholders into accepting the Genesis merger or precluded them from accepting another 
offer, but their status as minority shareholders.”); Davis, supra note 16, at 198. 
96.  See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 944 (Del. 2003) (Veasey,
C.J., dissenting) (“The proper inquiry in this case is whether the NCS board had taken actions that 
‘have the effect of causing the stockholders to vote in favor of the proposed transaction for some 
reason other than the merits of that transaction.’”); Leo E. Strine, Jr., If Corporate Action Is Lawful, 
Presumably There Are Circumstances in Which It’s Equitable to Take That Action: The Important 
Corollary to the Rule of Schnell v. Chris-Craft, 60 BUS. LAW 877, 900-01 (2005) (asserting that the 
majority’s rationale for its coercion finding ignored “an arguably necessary premise . . . namely, that 
the question of preclusion and coercion are designed to frame an inquiry into whether the 
stockholders have, by inequitable board action, been prevented from accepting a valuable takeover 
offer or been coerced into accepting a board-approved transaction”). 
97.  Omnicare, 818 A.3d at 944-45 (Veasey, C.J., dissenting).  As later pointed out by
Chancellor Strine, “[In Omnicare], of course, stockholders who controlled a majority of the votes 
and who were receiving the same per share consideration as the minority, had approved the 
transaction, meaning that free and unconflicted stockholder choice was vindicated.”  Strine, supra 
note 96, at 900-01. 
98.  See Smith, supra note 10, at 994. 
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agreements.  In our view, this new rule is an unwise extension of 
existing precedent.”99 
3. The Majority Opinion Represents Improper Judicial Second-
Guessing 
The dissent also criticized the majority for failing to “respect the 
reasoned judgment of the board of directors and give effect to the wishes 
of the controlling stockholders.”100  In its evaluation of the deal 
protection devices, the majority stated that “[t]he latitude a board will 
have in either maintaining or using the defensive devices it has adopted 
to protect the merger it approved will vary according to the degree of 
detriment to the stockholders’ interest that is presented by the value or 
terms of the subsequent competing transaction.”101  Critics condemn this 
approach as contrary to established Delaware law in that it evaluates the 
reasonableness and validity of a board’s decision to agree to deal 
protection devices in light of later events.102  Indeed, Delaware law is 
clear that it is not the role of the courts, with the benefit of hindsight, to 
second-guess a board’s business decision in the absence of self-interest 
99.  Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 943 (Veasey, C.J., dissenting); see also Hanewicz, supra note 2, 
at 538 (“Notice that the court did not apply Unocal in such a way as to police certain types of board 
behavior or action . . . that might be corrected by some future board, . . . [i]nstead, the court made an 
absolute decision that there should be no complete lock-ups.”). 
 100.  Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 940 (Veasey, C.J., dissenting); see also Hanewicz, supra note 2, 
at 537 (asserting that the Omnicare court “unambiguously chose itself as the decision-maker” and 
thus “divested the board of decision-making authority with respect to complete lock-ups”). 
101.  Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 933 (majority opinion) (emphasis added). 
 102.  See id. at 940 & 947-48 (Veasey, C.J., dissenting); see also Orman v. Cullman, No. 
18039, 2004 WL 2348395, at *8 n.98 (Del. Ch. Oct. 20, 2004) (“As formulated, the test [in 
Omnicare] would appear to result in judicial invalidation of negotiated contractual provisions based 
on the advantages of hindsight.”); Transcript of Oral Argument, at *99-101, In re El Paso Corp. 
S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432 (Del. Ch. 2012); Strine, supra note 96, at 901 n.99 (“Moreover, in a 
conceptual move that borders on the metaphysical, the Court indicated that the reasonableness of the 
NCS board’s actions would be determined, not by what they knew when they acted, but by later 
events.”); Clifford E. Neimeth & Cathy L. Reese, Locked and Loaded: Delaware Supreme Court 
Takes Aim at Deal Certainty, 7 No. 2 THE M&A LAWYER 16 (June 2003) (“We believe that if 
Omnicare is followed in its most broad sense, the decision may entirely subjugate the ‘real time’ 
validity and reasonableness of that process to the occurrence of unforeseen (post-decisional) 
economic events.”); Panagopoulos, supra note 11, at 441.  It should be noted, however, that not 
everyone reads this language in the majority’s opinion as the court judging the Genesis board’s 
decision in light of later events.  Rather, Vice Chancellor Laster has expressed the view that 
“Taking Omnicare as a whole, and giving the opinion a charitable reading, the majority did not 
attempt to change the point in time at which directors’ decisions are measured for compliance with 
their fiduciary duties. Omnicare does not require directors to be soothsayers, nor does it create a 
‘fiduciary put.’”  Laster, supra note 17, at 796, 818-19 (stating that “the timing of the majority’s 
fiduciary analysis has been overly criticized”). 
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or lack of due care.103  Thus, Delaware courts should exercise limited 
intervention and evaluate a board’s decision based on the information 
reasonably available at the time the decision was made and not based on 
later events.104  The majority’s approach in reviewing the NCS board’s 
decision in light of the later Omnicare bid was based on judicial second-
guessing and hindsight, directly contrary to Delaware jurisprudence. 
In specifically addressing some of what they saw as further failings 
of the majority’s analysis, the dissenting justices pointed out that the 
majority had also reviewed the NCS board’s actions as isolated actions 
in a vacuum, without taking into account the circumstances confronting 
NCS at the time.  Most prominently, the merger and voting agreements 
were the result of “a lengthy search and intense negotiation process in 
the context of insolvency and creditor pressure where no other viable bid 
had emerged”105 and of a “board’s disinterested, informed, good faith 
exercise of its business judgment.”106  The dissent criticized the majority 
for judging the NCS board’s actions in light of the fact that it was later 
known that the NCS stockholders could receive substantially more for 
their shares through Omnicare’s topping bid.107  At the time the NCS 
board was faced with the lock-up request from Genesis, the Chief Justice 
pointed out, the only value-enhancing transaction available was with that 
company, and had the NCS board not acceded to Genesis’ request it 
 103.  See Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 45 (Del. 1994); 
Auriga Capital Corp. v. Gatz Props., 40 A.3d 839, 854 (Del. Ch. 2012 ); In re Del Monte Foods Co. 
S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813, 830 (Del. Ch. 2011) (“Time-bound mortals cannot foresee the future. 
The test therefore cannot be whether, with hindsight, the directors actually achieved the best 
price.”); In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Deriv. Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 122 (Del. Ch. 2009) (stating that 
the business judgment rule prevents judicial second guessing of a board’s decision); Albert v. Alex. 
Brown Mgmt. Svcs., Inc., No. C.A. 04C-05-250 PLA, 2004 WL 2050527, at *4 (Del. Sept. 15, 
2004) (explaining that Delaware has a “strong policy to let the managers of corporate entities run 
them with minimal judicial second-guessing”). 
 104.  See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 874 (Del. 1985); Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 947 
(Steele, J., dissenting) (“Importantly, Smith v. Van Gorkom, correctly casts the focus on any court 
review of board action challenged for alleged breach of the fiduciary duty of care ‘only upon the 
basis of the information then reasonably available to the directors and relevant to their 
decision. . . .’”); id. at 940 (Veasey, C.J., dissenting) (“Rather, the NCS board’s good faith decision 
must be subject to a real-time review of the board action before the NCS-Genesis merger agreement 
was entered into.”); see also In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432 at 99 (stating that the 
court should review board actions “in realtime”); Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 
C.A. No. 6085, 14 Del. J. Corp. L. 273, 301 n.17 (Del. Ch. May 19, 1988) (Allen, C.) (“[T]he duty 
can only be to try in good faith . . . to get the best available transaction for the shareholders. 
Directors are not insurers.”). 
 105.  Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 940 (Del. 2003) (Veasey, C.J., 
dissenting). 
106.  Id. 
 107.  Id. (“Our jurisprudence cannot, however, be seen as turning on such ex post felicitous 
results.”). 
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would have lost the deal.108  Moreover, Justice Steele, in his separate 
dissenting opinion, pointed out that the decision to agree to the lock-up 
in the Genesis merger was an informed one made by an independent 
committee of the board and approved by the full board.  In his view, to 
second guess a board’s decision as the majority had done ran afoul of the 
fundamental principal of Delaware law that courts will not substitute 
their judgment for that of a careful, selfless board.109 
4. A Per Se Rule Invalidating Complete Lock-Ups Is Unsupported
by Delaware Case Law 
The most controversial aspect of the majority’s decision comes out 
of its third holding – that the NCS board owed an “unremitting” 
fiduciary duty to the minority stockholders and thus it was “required to 
contract for an effective fiduciary out clause” in the merger agreement 
with Genesis.110  Failure to do so, the majority held, was a breach of the 
directors’ fiduciary duties and invalidated the Genesis merger 
agreement.  Critics of this new bright-line rule argue that it is overbroad, 
inflexible, unsupported by Delaware law and an improper intrusion into 
the board’s decision-making authority. 
The per se rule in Omnicare has first been attacked for its lack of 
support in Delaware case law.111  Critics fault the majority for its 
misplaced reliance on the court’s prior decision in Paramount 
Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc.112 to support its finding that 
the NCS board’s “unremitting” fiduciary duties prevented it from 
agreeing to a merger agreement without a fiduciary out clause.113  The 
108.  Id. at 940-41. 
 109.  Id. at 948 (Steele, J., dissenting) (“If attorneys counseling well motivated, careful, and 
well-advised boards cannot be assured that their clients’ decision – sound at the time but later less 
economically beneficial only because of post-decision, unforeseeable events – will be respected by 
the courts, Delaware law, and the courts that expound it, may well be questioned.”).  Of course, this 
statement assumes that the NCS board was careful and selfless in negotiating and agreeing to the 
Genesis merger.  Justice Steele pointed out that the majority had identified no breach of the duty of 
loyalty or care by the NCS directors, but nonetheless sanctioned them for failing to insist upon a 
fiduciary out in the merger agreement.  Id.  Contrary to the majority’s approach, the Justice stated 
that he “would not shame the NCS board, which acted in accordance with every fine instinct that we 
wish to encourage, by invalidating their action approving the Genesis merger because they failed to 
insist upon a fiduciary out.”  Id. 
110.  See id. at 938-39 (majority opinion). 
111.  See id. at 945 (Veasey, C.J., dissenting) (“We know of no authority in our jurisprudence 
supporting this new rule, and we believe it is unwise and unwarranted.”). 
112.  Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 37 (Del. 1994). 
 113.  See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 945 (internal citations omitted); Griffith, supra note 8, at 592; 
Panagopoulos, supra note 11, at 467-68.  Critics also pointed out that the court’s decision in 
McMullin v. Beran, does not support the proposition for which it is cited by the majority.  See 
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QVC decision, the Chief Justice explained, “does not create a special 
duty to protect the minority stockholders from the consequences of a 
controlling stockholder’s ultimate decision unless the controlling 
stockholder stands on both sides of the transaction, which is certainly not 
the case here.”114  In fact, the situation in QVC is inapposite to that in 
Omnicare.  In QVC, the court was concerned about protecting 
Paramount’s public stockholders in the proposed change-of-control 
transaction where they would go from (in the aggregate) owning a 
majority of Paramount’s voting stock to, post-merger, being minority 
stockholders in a controlled corporation.115  Omnicare, on the other 
hand, was not a change-of-control situation.  This critical distinction, 
critics argue, demonstrates why the QVC court was correct in finding 
that the board had a fiduciary duty to serve the minority stockholders in 
their last chance to sell control of the corporation and why the Omnicare 
court was not.116 
Now Chief Justice Strine offers a slightly different angle on this 
criticism saying the per se rule of Omnicare blurs the well-established 
“law-equity divide” that exists in Delaware.117  This law-equity divide, 
Chief Justice Strine explains, means that Delaware courts will consider 
director and corporate action through the dual rubric of law and equity – 
first, is the action lawful; second, is the action equitable under the 
circumstances (e.g., Schnell v. Chris-Craft Industries).118  In light of this, 
he proposes a “corollary to the rule of Schnell.  To wit, if the General 
Assembly has declared certain acts lawful, presumably there must be 
circumstances in which those acts would be equitable (otherwise why 
permit the acts at all).  Fidelity to the corollary requires the judiciary to 
eschew the formulation of per se rules in equity.”119  Because the 
Panagopoulos, supra note 11, at 466-67. 
 114.  Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 946 (Veasey, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).  Nor does 
QVC, in the Chief Justice’s opinion, further extend the concept of “continuing fiduciary duties” to 
permit a court to second-guess a board’s weighing the risk and return with respect to the only 
possible transaction at that time versus a potential future offer that has not yet materialized.  Id. at 
945. 
115.  See QVC, 637 A.2d at 42-3 & 47. 
116.  See Griffith, supra note 8, at 592-93 (“QVC cannot be separated from the change-of-
control context on which its holding rests . . . . The absence of a change-of-control in Omnicare is a 
critical distinction between Omnicare and QVC.”); Panagopoulos, supra note 11, at 467-68.  
117.  Strine, supra note 96, at 903; see also Davis, supra note 16, at 188. 
 118.  Strine, supra note 96, at 880; see also Sample v. Morgan, 914 A.2d 647, 672 (Del. Ch. 
2007) (stating that under Delaware law decisions by fiduciaries are “‘twice-tested’ – once by the 
law and again by equity”).  In Schnell v. Chris-Craft Industries, the Delaware Supreme Court held 
that “inequitable action does not become permissible simply because it is legally possible.” Schnell 
v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971).
119.  Strine, supra note 96, at 883. 
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Omnicare holding invalidates any merger agreement with an absolute 
lock-up, even if permitted under the Delaware General Corporation Law, 
it amounts to a per se rule of equity and “renders indistinct the line 
between law and equity by announcing that legally authorized action is, 
in any conceivable circumstance, somehow invalid.”120 
Turning specifically to the majority’s analysis of the Genesis deal 
protection devices, Chief Justice Strine notes its failure to consider the 
issues before it through Delaware’s law-equity rubric.121  Each of the 
deal protection devices was lawful under the Delaware General 
Corporation Law.  Thus, under the law-equity rubric, to invalidate the 
provisions the majority would need to ask whether the provisions were 
equitable under the circumstances, which it did not do.  The majority 
failed to tie its ruling to any specific instance of the NCS board acting 
unreasonably in the circumstances or otherwise breaching its fiduciary 
duties.122  In Chief Justice Strine’s view, invalidating the Genesis deal 
protection devices without this analysis and setting forth a per se rule 
invalidating all future complete lock-ups not only exceeded Delaware’s 
law-equity divide, but also trended into the realm of legislative 
lawmaking by the majority.123 
Finally, critics point out that an inherent problem in any per se rule 
is its rigidity and Omnicare’s per se ban on absolute lock-ups is no 
exception.  A rule that mandates a fiduciary out provision for a 
 120.  Id. at 902.  To further illustrate his point, Chief Justice Strine provides the following 
example: 
[I]magine a seller that has conducted a full market search for buyers for a year.  In the 
last round, the seller is down to three bidders, who have completed due diligence and en-
gaged in a few weeks of preliminary competition.  To extract the very last nickel from 
the bidders’ pockets, the seller, which has a majority stockholder who has agreed to 
share the control premium ratably with the minority, indicates that final bids will be due 
in a week and that the high bidder will get an ‘absolutely locked up’ deal including a 
force-the-vote provision, a voting agreement from the majority stockholder, and no fidu-
ciary out.  Under the strict reasoning of Omnicare, that action would be invalid, yet it is 
difficult to see why such an agreement would be inequitable. 
Id. at 902.  However, as one commentator has noted in response to Chief Justice Strine’s critique of 
Omnicare’s per se rule: “[I]f one believes that absolute lock-ups involving a majority shareholder 
are always inequitable, then this rule remains a violation of the form of equitable jurisprudence but 
is far less troubling because we would expect equitable review to reach substantially the same result 
as the per se rule in most every case.”  Davis, supra note 16, at 191. 
121.  Strine, supra note 96, at 902-03. 
 122.  Id.; see also Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 948 (Del. 2003) 
(Steele, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority held that the NCS board’s actions were invalid 
without finding any breach of loyalty or care). 
123.  Strine, supra note 96, at 903 (“For the judiciary to decide that in all possible 
circumstances, particular legally authorized acts are forbidden, is for the judiciary to place itself 
clearly on the law side of the law-equity divide.”); see also Davis, supra note 16, at 188. 
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transaction to be enforceable provides no room for a board to completely 
lock-up a deal where it might, in fact, be in the best interests of the 
stockholders to do so.  Nor does such a rule allow for the kind of factual 
case-by-case analysis in determining the validity of a particular 
combination of deal protection devices for which the Delaware courts 
are known.124  Critics assert that such a result essentially “usurp[s] the 
proper role of the board of directors” and “limit[s] a board’s ability to 
discharge its fiduciary duty to act in stockholders’ best interests”125 in 
light of the specific circumstances before it. 
Moreover, due to the majority’s ambiguous reasoning and lack of 
support in Delaware case law, critics express concern that Omnicare’s 
per se ban has potentially overbroad implications on precommitment 
strategies.  Noting that precommitment strategies such as deal protection 
devices are not limited to mergers and acquisitions, scholars express 
concern that these other measures could also be invalidated in light of 
the Omnicare decision.126  “[T]he broad language used by the court, 
stating that no contractual provision can validly define or limit a board’s 
fiduciary duties, clearly elevates corporate law considerations above 
contract principles and deal certainty.”127  The majority’s arguably broad 
holding thus leaves open the question: What contracts post-Omnicare 
will require fiduciary out clauses to be enforceable and which will not? 
 124.  See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 950 (Steele, J., dissenting) (questioning, “Instead of 
thoughtful, retrospective, restrained flexibility focused on the circumstances existing at the time of 
the decision, have we now moved to a bright line regulatory alternative?”). 
 125.  Panagopoulos, supra note 11, at 441, 469-70; see Stephen M. Bainbridge, 
Precommitment Strategies in Corporate Law: The Case of Dead Hand and No Hand Pills, 29 J. 
CORP. L. 1, 32 (2003) (“Given the considerable virtues of authority-based decision-making, 
however, such mechanisms should proceed on a case-by-case basis rather than by adopting 
prophylactic restrictions on the board’s authority.”); Smith, supra note 10, at 996 (stating that 
Omnicare’s per se rule “invited unwarranted judicial review into the risk/return analyses of boards 
of directors, which have traditionally been granted judicial deference under the business judgment 
rule”) (citing Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 945). 
 126.  See Hanewicz, supra note 2, at 561-62; see also Bainbridge, supra note 125, at 32 
(expressing concern prior to Omnicare that precommitment provisions might be invalidated in light 
of Delaware court’s prior rulings invalidating dead-hand and no-hand poison pills); Jay H. Knight, 
Merger Agreements Post-Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc.: How the Delaware Supreme 
Court Pulled the Plug on “Mathematical Lock-Ups,” 31 N. KY. L. REV. 29, 49-50 (2004).  Just a 
few examples of precommitment strategies that could be implicated by Omnicare’s per se rule 
include bond covenants, fair price shark repellents, and nonredeemable poison pills.  While the 
majority in Omnicare attempted to distinguish other precommitment provisions from those at issue, 
discerning a clear demarcation between what is permissible and what is not may prove difficult.  See 
Hanewicz, supra note 2, at 561-62. 
127.  Smith, supra note 10, at 997. 
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B. Practical Impact on Mergers and Acquisitions 
Omnicare’s criticism is not limited to its perceived doctrinal 
shortcomings. Critics are equally vocal regarding the negative impact 
Omnicare’s ban on complete lock-ups would have, as practical matter, 
on the M&A market.  Following the decision, scholars and practitioners 
alike feared that it would discourage potential bidders or, at a minimum, 
cause bidders to offer lower prices, ultimately leading to decreased value 
for targets and their stockholders.128  Further, Omnicare’s elimination of 
the ability to precommit to a transaction would limit the negotiating 
position of target boards of directors.129  For instance, proponents of 
complete lock-ups contend that target corporations will lose credibility 
in negotiations in that a target can never truly commit to a transaction.130  
The result being lower offers to targets and/or the potential loss of 
transactions entirely,131 again to the detriment of the target’s 
stockholders.132 
Concerns regarding the practical impact of Omnicare were again 
first expressed by the dissenting justices.  Chief Justice Veasey and 
Justice Steele worried that the majority’s opinion and its per se ban on 
complete lock-ups would have a deterrent effect and that the universe of 
future bidders “who could reasonably be expected to benefit 
 128.  See Arons, supra note 76, at 130 (“The [Omnicare] decision may cause potential bidders 
to offer lower prices, especially early in the negotiations for fear that higher offers cannot (or will 
not) be protected with any guarantee, and simply be used as a stalking horse to seek higher bidders 
to subsequently enter negotiations.”); Griffith, supra note 8, at 614; Tamara Loomis, Beware, 
Delaware, the State’s Recent Supreme Court Decisions Make Waves, 229 NEW YORK L.J. 5, 5 
(2003) (“There are real life cases in which bidders turn away because they didn’t get lockup 
protection . . . .”) (quoting Robert Profusek, a partner at Jones Day, New York); Christopher J. 
Moceri, Comment, M&A Lockups: Broadly Applying the Omnicare Decision to Require Fiduciary 
Outs in All Merger Agreements, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1157, 1166-67 (2004) (“On the other hand, 
lockups may affect whether a company will even enter into a bidding contest.”) (citing Marcel 
Kahan & Michael Klausner, Lockups and the Market for Corporate Control, 48 STAN. L. REV. 
1539, 1544 (1996)); Quinn, supra note 17, at 876 n.52 & 54; see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, 
Exclusive Merger Agreements and Lock-Ups in Negotiated Corporate Acquisitions, 75 MINN. L. 
REV. 239, 283 (1990) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Exclusive Merger Agreements] (stating that “rational 
bidders presumably discount their bids to account for the risk that the target board will renege”); 
Jennifer J. Johnson & Mary Siegel, Corporate Mergers: Redefining the Role of Target Directors, 
136 U. PA. L. REV. 315, 365 n.170 (1987) (stating that “[a]n acquiring company predicates it 
offering price upon (i) the value of the target, and (ii) risks involved in attempting the acquisition”). 
129.  See Griffith, supra note 8, at 571. 
130.  See infra notes 141-43 and accompanying text. 
131.  See Quinn, supra note 17, at 876 n.52 & 54. 
132.  See Griffith, supra note 8, at 571, 606-13 (“Boards can no longer follow a 
‘precommitment strategy,’ committing to sell to a particular bidder at some point in the negotiation 
process in order to force the hand of the other bidders at the table.”). 
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stockholders could shrink or disappear.”133  The Chief Justice pointed 
out that “[a] lock-up permits a target board and a bidder to ‘exchange 
certainties’” and that “certainty has value.”134  In situations such as the 
one facing the NCS board, deal certainty in the form of a lock-up may be 
necessary to retain the only value-enhancing transaction available at the 
time.135  Summing up his pragmatic concerns, the Chief Justice wrote: 
“Situations will arise where business realities demand a lock-up so that 
wealth-enhancing transactions may go forward.  Accordingly, any 
bright-line rule prohibiting lock-ups could, in circumstances such as 
these, chill otherwise permissible conduct.”136 
Of course Chief Justice Veasey’s recognition of the value of 
certainty was not a new idea; support for precommitment strategies, 
broadly, in corporate law existed well before Omnicare.137  In 
eliminating a board’s ability to precommit to a transaction, critics assert, 
the majority took away something very valuable.138  This value may take 
many forms.  For instance, precommitment strategies have been shown 
to have economic value to target corporations in the context of merger 
negotiations.139  An acquirer generally will be willing to pay a higher 
 133.  Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 946 (Del. 2003) (Veasey, C.J., 
dissenting); see also id. at 948 (Steele, J., dissenting) (“The majority’s proscriptive rule limits the 
scope of a board’s cost benefit analysis by taking the bargaining chip of foregoing a fiduciary out 
‘off the table’ in all circumstances.”). 
 134.  Id. at 942.  The court had previously acknowledged the value of certainty in Rand v. 
Western Air Lines, where the court affirmed the Chancery Court’s decision to uphold a board’s 
decision to grant its only bidder a stock option agreement to acquire thirty percent of the target 
corporation’s stock.; Rand v. W. Air Lines, Inc., C.A. No. 8632, 1994 WL 89006 (Del. Ch. Feb. 25, 
1994) aff’d, 659 A.2d 228 (Del. 1995). 
 135.  Id. at 941-42, 946 (noting that the NCS board acceded to Genesis’ request to lock-up the 
merger so as to secure the only value-enhancing transaction available – an essential fact). 
136.  Id. at 942. 
 137.  See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 125, at 25-26 (asking “why should a board of directors 
have an ongoing fiduciary duty to constantly reevaluate its decision?” and arguing that there is no 
satisfying answer to this question yet from Delaware courts).  Commentators have also been 
favorable specifically to lock-ups in mergers.  See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Analyzing Stock Lock-Ups: Do 
Target Treasury Sales Foreclose or Facilitate Takeover Auctions?, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 682, 704 
(1990); Bainbridge, Exclusive Merger Agreements, supra note 128, at 289, 327-32; Stephen Fraidin 
& Jon D. Hanson, Toward Unlocking Lockups, 103 YALE L.J. 1739, 1834 (1994); David A. Skeel, 
Jr., A Reliance Damages Approach to Corporate Lockups, 90 NW. U.L. REV. 564, 595-600 (1995). 
138.  Davis, supra note 16, at 199 (“Is the Omnicare court correct to interpret precommitment 
devices as a clear evil?  While the court insists that it is preserving the ability of the board ‘to 
discharge its fiduciary duties at all times,’ it would seem obvious that it is taking away something 
valuable as well.”). 
 139.  See Griffith, supra note 8, at 605; Hanewicz, supra note 2, at 559 (discussing the higher 
prices buyers may be willing to pay for the extra protection associated with completely locked-up 
offers); Michael J. Kennedy, The End of Time? Delaware’s Search for the Fiduciary Gut, M&A 
LAW., Oct. 2003, at *6 (“[A]s any economist will tell you, an [fiduciary out] option has a price, and 
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price for the added protection and certainty offered by a completely 
locked-up deal.140  Secondly, and somewhat relatedly, certainty can have 
negotiating value.141  Precommitment strategies can entice potential 
buyers to evaluate target corporations and bring them to the table.142  
Knowing that it could secure a transaction alleviates a buyer’s concern 
that it will be a stalking horse for later bids.  Further, the ability to trade 
deal certainty allows a target corporation to credibly convey its 
intentions in negotiations with potential buyers.143  In being able to 
completely commit to a proposed transaction, a target board signals to a 
buyer that it supports that deal.  The failure of the Omnicare majority to 
recognize, let alone weigh, the costs and benefits associated with 
precommitment strategies and the elimination thereof led proponents of 
such tools to assert that the decision is in fact detrimental to target 
corporations and their stockholders.144  As summarized by two 
commentators, “In that we live in a prevailing corporate and market 
environment replete with buyer hesitation and hypercaution, it would be 
most unfortunate if overreaction to the Omnicare decision increases 
buyer recalcitrance and precludes a motivated buyer from putting its 
very best deal and price on the table in exchange for closing certainty 
out of fear that a fully locked-up deal subsequently may be judicially 
second-guessed upon the unforeseen emergence of a potentially superior 
proposal – even if the target’s process leading to the signing and 
announcement otherwise was ostensibly pristine.”145 
because such a target will not actually pay money to a buyer for the option the economic price for 
the option will be paid for by the target shareholders in the form of a lower initial deal price.”); see 
also Bainbridge, supra note 125, at 26.  But see Griffith, supra note 8, at 616-17 (acknowledging 
that precommitment strategies can result in costs to stockholders as well); Moceri, supra note 128, 
at 1166-67 (discussing arguments that lock-ups “do not alter the outcomes of bidding contests” and 
“do not affect the value that a bidder gives” to a target corporation; rather lock-ups “reduce[] the 
price paid for the target company while increasing profit to the losing company, since the losing 
company receives the value of the lockup despite losing the chance to acquire”) (citing Kahan & 
Klausner, supra note 128, at 1544).  As the NCS-Genesis merger showed, precommitment strategies 
can also have value to a potential buyer “who may be worried that a subsequent bidder (like 
Omnicare) will emerge to break up the deal and ‘steal’ the target.”  Hanewicz, supra note 2, at 559. 
140.  See supra notes 128 & 134. 
 141.  See Griffith, supra note 8, at 606-613 (evaluating the strategic value of precommitment 
through a number of game theory simulations and concluding that precommitment is a valuable tool 
in merger negotiations). 
142.  See id. at 613; Hanewicz, supra note 2, at 559-60. 
143.  See Griffith, supra note 8, at 615. 
144.  See Davis, supra note 16, at 200; Griffith, supra note 8, at 597 (“[I]t is plain that the 
majority’s analysis did not adequately address the considerations arising from the elimination of 
precommitment.”); Hanewicz, supra note 2, at 558-60. 
145.  Neimeth & Reese, supra note 102, at 6. 
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IV. OMNICARE’S IMPACT ON MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
Given the perceived flaws and incorrect outcome in the Omnicare 
case, critics predicted an immediate impact on the mergers and 
acquisitions market, with negative effects on the number, structure, and 
value of corporate transactions.  Critics were worried that Omnicare had 
effectively turned Delaware into an option contract state, leaving open 
the possibility that a trumping bid could come at any time.146  As a 
result, the potential universe of bidders would shrink or disappear, lead 
to lower prices being offered to target corporations, or both.147  
However, in the decade following the decision, these concerns do not, to 
a large extent, appear to have materialized.148  Immediately following 
Omnicare’s issuance, and in the years since, there has not appeared to 
have been a marked decline in merger transactions.149  Similarly, there 
was not a substantial chilling effect on the use of any individual deal 
protection provision, in particular the ones at issue in the decision itself 
(e.g., force-the-vote provision, voting agreements).150  In fact, Professors 
Davidoff and Sautter have found that post-Omnicare, the number and 
type of deal protection devices have significantly increased.151 
The fears of Omnicare’s negative impact have not come true for 
many reasons.  First, many factors drive M&A activity, with the ability 
to precommit to a particular transaction being only one of those.  
Potential acquirers may also be motivated to pursue and engage in 
mergers and acquisitions because of synergistic gains, regulatory 
changes, changes in the market, globalization, a desire to increase 
 146.  See Griffith, supra note 8, at 595; David Marcus, Holland’s Clarity Is Others’ Confusion, 
CORP. CENT. ALERT, May 2003, at 12-13 (quoting a Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz client 
memorandum). 
 147.  See Omnicare, Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 946 (Del. 2003) 
(Veasey, C.J. , dissenting); Davidoff, Long Slow Death, supra note 8 (“Some even asserted that 
bidders may no longer attempt to bid as frequently since they could no longer get the certainty they 
required in agreeing to acquisitions.”); Neimeth & Reese, supra note 102, at 16. 
 148.  See Megan W. Shaner, Revisiting Omnicare: What Does Its Status 10 Years Later Tell 
Us?, 38 J. CORP. L. 865 (2013) (discussing M&A transactions and use of deal protection devices 
following Omnicare); see also Davidoff, Long Slow Death, supra note 8 (stating that “[t]his parade 
of horrible did not come to pass”).  This concern also begs the question: “Why should Delaware 
care if there is a decline in merger activity?”; Sean J. Griffith, Deal Protection Provisions in the 
Last Period of Play, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1899, 1935-36 (2003) [hereinafter Griffith, Last Period 
of Play]. 
 149.  Shaner, supra note 148, at 878-79 (noting that merger activity in the years following 
Omnicare increased); see Laster, supra note 17, at 833 (stating that following Omnicare “M&A 
continued, even bubbled”). 
150.  Id. 
 151.  See Steven M. Davidoff & Christina M. Sautter, Lock-Up Creep, 38 J. CORP. L. 681, 
683-88 (2013). 
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market presence (or relatedly, decrease competition) and 
diversification.152  These other factors and the associated potential gains 
therefrom appear to override any possible negative effect Omnicare 
would have had on the M&A landscape. 
Second, corporate practitioners quickly adapted to the new rules set 
forth in Omnicare in structuring transactions.  The Omnicare majority 
made clear that it was not invalidating the use of deal protection devices 
generally,153 thus alternative combinations of deal protection devices 
emerged that provide the maximum amount of deal certainty possible 
while avoiding invalidation.154  Relatedly, the Delaware Court of 
Chancery upheld some of these alternative transaction structures and, in 
connection therewith, limited the application of Omnicare.  Since its 
issuance, three notable decisions of the Court of Chancery addressed 
Omnicare-based challenges to mergers.  In each of these decisions, the 
court distinguished the valid combination of deal protection measures 
before it from the invalid fait accompli in Omnicare.  In Orman v. 
Cullman, for instance, the court’s holding and rationale indicate that so 
long as it is theoretically possible for an alternative transaction to be 
considered and approved by a target corporation’s stockholders, 
Omnicare would be inapplicable.155  Similarly, in Optima International 
of Miami v. WCI Steel, Inc.,156 and more recently In re OPENLANE, 
Inc., Shareholders Litigation,157 the court upheld the sign-and-consent 
structure of a merger agreement that required stockholder approval of 
the merger to occur immediately following board approval of the deal.158  
152.  Id. (discussing the different factors that play a role in merger activity). 
153.  See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 938-39; Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 8, at 1460 
(“Omnicare does not preclude the use of deal protection devices in the future . . . . ”). 
 154.  See Alexander B. Johnson & Roberto Zapata, Optima Is Optimal: Sidestepping Omnicare 
in Private Company M&A Transactions, DEAL POINTS: THE NEWSLETTER OF THE COMMITTEE ON 
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS, Summer 2009, at 2 (discussing alternative deal structures to avoid 
Omnicare’s application); Neimeth & Reese, supra note 102; Laster, supra note 17, at 833 
(“[Omnicare] did not limit the ability of deal planners to agree to a range of other common 
protective measures, such as termination fees, no-shop provisions, match rights, or even voting 
agreements covering a lesser percentage of shares. These features give an initial bidder a significant 
leg up and provide ample reasons for a potential acquirer to want incumbent merger-party status.”). 
155.  Orman v. Cullman, C.A. No. 18039, 2004 WL 2348395 (Del. Ch. Oct. 20, 2004). 
 156.  Transcript of Oral Argument, C.A. No. 3833-VCL (Del. Ch. June 27, 2008).  In Optima, 
Vice Chancellor Lamb (who also issued the ruling in Omnicare that was subsequently overturned), 
commented that “Omnicare is of questionable continued vitality.”  Id. at 127. 
157.  In re OPENLANE, C.A. No. 6849–VCN, 2011 WL 4599662 (Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2011). 
158.  Because corporations with controlling stockholders can, based on Optima and 
OPENLANE, take advantage of the sign-and-consent structure as a way to lock-up a transaction by 
securing immediate stockholder approval, Omnicare as a practical matter has very few instances of 
applicability.  See Davidoff, Long Slow Death, supra note 8 Shaner, supra note 148 at 875 
(discussing the rare instances where Omnicare has, as a practical matter, applicability in Delaware); 
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In distinguishing and limiting Omnicare’s applicability to the disputes 
before it, the court used language and reasoning similar to the view 
encouraged by the dissenting justices in Omnicare – that a board of 
directors should be granted judicial deference in evaluating decisions 
regarding deal protection measures.159  Additionally, the court relied 
heavily in Orman, Optima, and OPENLANE on the distinction between 
the mathematically impossible Omnicare structure and the other three 
theoretically possible transaction structures as the basis for validity, in 
particular where the court acknowledged that the intent (and practical 
effect) of the structures at issue was to lock-up the deal.  This suggests 
that the Court of Chancery in these decisions was seeking to narrow the 
scope of a decision with which it disagreed.160  In light of the fact that 
Omnicare was almost immediately undercut by these Court of Chancery 
decisions, it may very well be the case that Omnicare did not cause a 
change in the M&A market because it was never really given a chance to 
affect it in the first place. 
V. THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF OMNICARE TO CORPORATE LAW 
In the decade since it was issued, reception to the Omnicare 
decision has been overwhelmingly critical.  As discussed in Part III, 
judges, practitioners, and academics point to the majority opinion’s 
Daniel E. Wolf, Noble Prose: Sound Bites on Public M&A, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (Oct. 26, 2011 9:33 A.M.), 
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2011/10/26/noble-prose-sound-bites-on-public-ma/.  (“For 
targets where written consent by shareholders is permitted, Omnicare may be dead in practice, even 
if not in law.”). 
 159.  See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument, Optima Int’l of Miami v. WCI Steel, Inc., C.A. 
No. 3833-VCL (Del. Ch. June 27, 2008) at 138 (“I don’t substitute my judgment for that of the 
board or my business judgment for the board’s judgment.  My job is to look at what the directors 
did and determine whether the actions they took are within the range of reasonableness.”); see also 
Eleonora Gerasimchuk, Stretching the Limits of Deal Protections Devices: From Omnicare to 
Wachovia, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 685, 717-18 (2010). 
 160.  See Davidoff, Long Slow Death, supra note 8 (“All in all, the actions of the Chancery 
Court here provide a nice picture of how Delaware works: how the court responds to decisions 
perceived by its constituencies (lawyers, corporations, even stockholders) to be wrong.”); Janine M. 
Salomone & David B. DiDonato, In re OPENLANE Bolsters Omnicare and Sheds New Light on 
Revlon, BUSINESS LAW TODAY (Dec. 30, 2011), http://www.americanbar.org/publications/blt/2011/ 
12/delaware_insider.html (stating that “certain commentators characterized the OPENLANE 
decision as another step toward burying Omnicare”); Guhan Subramanian, Go-Shops vs. No-Shops 
in Private Equity Deals: Evidence and Implications, 63 BUS. LAW. 729, 758 n.118 (2008) (stating 
that Omnicare “is perceived to be weak precedent among practitioners, academics, and even other 
judges”); Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 8, at 1461 (“Nevertheless, Orman indicates a possible 
trend toward limiting the majority holding in Omnicare to its facts.”); Wolf, supra note 158.  This 
has led many corporate scholars and commentators to ask what, if anything, is really left of 
Omnicare today. 
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questionable doctrinal footing, its potential negative effects on the 
mergers and acquisitions market, and its poor corporate policy 
implications.  Further, given the limited manner in which the Delaware 
courts subsequently applied Omnicare, it begs the question of the 
decision’s relevance and actual impact, if any, on corporate law.  At the 
same time, however, Delaware’s highest court strives for unanimity in 
its decisions, so the fact that three of the five justices supported the 
opinion suggests it would be a mistake to dismiss the case entirely.  
Indeed, even though the dissenting justices “strongly believe[d] that the 
majority opinion was wrong-headed,” one has subsequently 
acknowledged that the decision represents an intellectual disagreement 
regarding the proper use of deal protection devices and complete lock-
ups.161 
In revisiting Omnicare it is not the purpose of this article to defend 
the majority opinion’s rationale and holdings.  Many of the criticisms 
raised regarding the majority’s incorrect interpretation and improper 
extension of Delaware corporate law are well-founded.  Further, both the 
majority’s application of Unocal review and establishment of a per se 
rule against complete lock-ups appear to be a more formalistic approach 
to protecting stockholder interests.  That is, the majority’s holdings in 
effect require target boards to follow a specific process to result in 
enforceable merger agreements.  Or, stated another way, the decision 
deters a certain process – agreeing to a completely locked-up 
transaction.  The intent of this article is to take a different approach from 
the majority’s formalistic one in discussing how Omnicare protects 
stockholders interests and improves corporate governance.  The decision 
does so by setting forth broad normative principles that play an 
important role in shaping current merger and acquisition law and 
decision-making.  When evaluating the court’s decision from this 
perspective, one can conclude that the importance of Omnicare to 
corporate law does not come from the vitality of its specific holdings or 
whether the decision can be easily avoided by creative contract drafting.  
Omnicare’s contributions to shaping our current merger and acquisition 
law and practices come from the message underlying the majority 
opinion – that, like in all decisions, but particularly in significant 
situations like mergers, directors must take an active role and be mindful 
 161.  See E. Norman Veasey, Musings from the Center of the Corporate Universe, 7 DEL. L. 
REV. 163, 172 (2004); see also Randy J. Holland & David A. Skeel, Jr., Deciding Cases Without 
Controversy, 5 DEL. L. REV. 115, 128 (2002) (explaining that where members of the Delaware 
Supreme Court have dissented, those opinions have been said to “illustrate that principled 
differences of opinion about the law [are] . . . never compromised for the sake of unanimity”). 
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of their fiduciary obligations.  It is this aspect of Omnicare that is 
significant. 
In what can be said as characteristic of the Delaware style, the 
Omnicare decision provides a norm-based account of how directors 
should and should not behave in negotiating and approving mergers, 
particularly deal protection devices.162  In a jurisdiction where the courts 
appear to say “no” to boards of directors infrequently, instead granting 
great deference under the business judgment rule to their decisions, 
Omnicare goes against that tendency, signaling to directors and their 
counsel that more careful consideration of their fiduciary obligations is 
required, as they will be held accountable for their decisions.  Several 
aspects of the majority’s opinion contribute to this message: (i) a 
renewed attention to deal protection devices, (ii) director accountability 
for decisions regarding deal protection devices, (iii) preserving 
optionality in mergers and acquisitions, (iv) advancing the corporate 
policy of protecting stockholder interests, and (v) providing a precise 
rule for corporate actors to follow. 
Thus, Omnicare impacted director decision-making in a positive 
manner – reminding directors of their fiduciary obligations and 
encouraging thoughtful consideration in the negotiation and approval of 
mergers, which then leads to better governance and greater stockholder 
value.  It is in this respect that Omnicare’s contribution to corporate law 
can be viewed in much the same way as one of the Delaware Supreme 
Court’s other famously controversial decisions, Smith v. Van Gorkom.163  
Also a split decision, the court in Van Gorkom held that the target board 
had acted in a grossly negligent manner and that its approval of the 
proposed merger was not the product of an informed business 
judgment.164  In each of these cases, subsequent events arguably eroded 
the decision’s holdings – in the case of Van Gorkom, the adoption of 
director exculpation statutes, and in the case of Omnicare, limited 
interpretation and application by the Court of Chancery.  But the 
normative value of each of these decisions does not hinge on the vitality 
of their specific legal holdings.  What is important, rather, is the court’s 
 162.  See Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 
UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1012-13 (1997) (describing Delaware fiduciary duty case law as normative 
stories on how directors should behave); see also David Fox, Delaware Decisions: Data Points, Not 
Doctrine HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL 
REGULATION (May 31, 2012 9:53 A.M.), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/05/31/ 
delaware-decisions-data-points-not-doctrine/ (stating that Delaware M&A opinions “offer market 
participants useful insights into best practices”). 
163.  Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
164.  Id. at 893. 
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message to directors that they need to take ownership of their fiduciary 
obligations and have an active role in corporate decision-making.  The 
court in both Omnicare and Van Gorkom is expressing corporate 
community norms with respect to director decision-making.  At the same 
time the court is also protecting and reinforcing those norms by holding 
directors accountable for their decisions, which aids in creating that very 
same community.165  Through these decisions, the court is essentially 
communicating those standards of proper conduct not only to the parties 
involved in the case, but also to corporate America generally.166  Stated 
another way, through its decision the court is teaching lawyers how to 
facilitate good corporate governance, not regulate corporate governance.  
As a result, these landmark cases continue to influence corporate 
decision-making today. 
A. Renewed Attention to Deal Protection Devices 
Beginning in the late 1970s and early 1980s Delaware courts were 
faced with an active market for control of corporations.167  As merger 
and acquisition activity increased so, too, did the use of deal protection 
devices.168  In connection with their review of the many hostile 
takeovers during this time, the courts expressed discomfort and 
skepticism with respect to the use of strong deal protection devices.  
This is because deal protection devices have important implications for 
corporate governance and directors’ fiduciary duties.169  As a result, 
beginning in the mid-1980s, a string of decisions issued by the Delaware 
courts limited the use of deal protection devices in the merger context.170  
165.  See Rock, supra note 162, at 1016 n.15. 
 166.  Id. at 1019; see id. at 1152 (discussing that Delaware opinions in the MBO context “made 
clear to the planners of all future deals that the court expects a higher standard of behavior”); see 
also William T. Allen, The Pride and the Hope of Delaware Corporate Law, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
70, 76 (1999) (“Van Gorkom exploded on the world of corporate directors.  People most definitely 
took notice of its stern message.  From an ex-ante perspective, it almost certainly has had a positive 
effect on corporate governance.”). 
167.  As described by former Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, “During the 1980s, 
the Delaware Supreme Court developed a jurisprudence to deal with the extant hostile takeover 
environment, which seemed to confound the traditional business judgment approach.”  Veasey & Di 
Guglielmo, supra note 8, at 1454; see also Strine, supra note 96, at 884 (“The advent of the hostile 
takeover era put in play. . .the question of the balance of power between law (i.e., the DGCL and 
corporate instruments) and equity (i.e., the fiduciary duties of directors) in addressing this new 
market phenomenon.”). 
168.  See also Coates & Subramanian, supra note 19, at 310. 
 169.  See infra notes 173-75, 178-81 and accompanying text (discussing the impact deal 
protection devices have on corporate governance and discharging fiduciary duties). 
170.  See Panagopoulos, supra note 11, at 441; Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 8, at 1454 
(“Unocal, represented the sea change in the takeover jurisprudence of the mid-1980s, although Van 
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The majority’s decision in Omnicare was consistent with this prior 
jurisprudence in its judicial scrutiny of a board’s decision to agree to 
deal protection devices,171 but extended that case law in three important 
ways. 
First, in holding that Unocal was the proper standard of review for 
the deal protection devices, the Omnicare majority extended enhanced 
judicial scrutiny of those provisions to non-change-in-control, friendly 
mergers as well.  Most of the deal protection cases arose out of the 
hostile takeover era and thus involved hostile transactions (triggering 
Unocal scrutiny) and/or change-in-control transactions (triggering 
Revlon scrutiny).  This left deal protection devices in friendly, non-
change-in-control mergers arguably analyzed under a totally different 
framework, subject to the deferential business judgment rule review.172  
Regardless of the context, however, a merger is one of, if not the, most 
important events in a corporation’s life span, thus “implicat[ing] 
accountability concerns, raising proverbial judicial eyebrows due to 
conflict of interest concerns between the personal interest of directors 
and the overall corporate policy protection afforded to shareholders.”173  
Whether a transaction is hostile or friendly or results in a change-in-
control or not in a change-in-control, the purpose of deal protection 
devices is the same – to defend the current transaction by deterring 
subsequent bids (actual or possible) and render the transaction immune 
Gorkom, Moran, and Revlon, all decided in that watershed year, 1985, were also landmark cases 
that live with us daily, well into the twenty-first century.”); see also Bainbridge, supra note 125, at 
24 (“In a number of cases, the Delaware courts have expressed doubts as to whether merger 
exclusivity provisions are consistent with the board of directors’ fiduciary duties.”) (citing 
Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 48-49 (Del. 1994); Revlon, Inc. v. 
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1986)).  “The key departure here is 
that the business judgment rule (which presumes proper process and rationality) has been 
supplanted in these takeover situations by an objective test of reasonableness – not found in the 
business judgment rule.”  Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 8, at 1454. 
 171.  See, e.g., Ryan v. Lyondell Chem. Co., C.A. No. 3176–VCN, 2008 WL 2923427, at *16 
n.96 (Del. Ch. July 29, 2008), rev’d by Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235 (Del. 2009) 
(“Thus, Omnicare did not mark an analytical sea change; instead, it is consistent with numerous 
cases in which this court has carefully scrutinized a board’s decision to grant deal protections before 
according it the deference normally given to directors’ business decisions.”). 
 172.  See Lebovitch & Morrison, supra note 17, at 4 (discussing the uncertainty surrounding 
what standard of review should apply to adoption of deal protection devices in merger of equals 
transactions – Unocal or the business judgment rule – and the divided views of the Court of 
Chancery). 
 173.  Amy Y. Yeung & Charles B. Vincent, Delaware’s “No-Go” Treatment of No-Talk 
Provisions: Deal-Protection Devices after Omnicare, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 311, 322 (2008).  Concern 
regarding these conflicts may be especially great where, as was the case in Omnicare, there are 
large stockholders who support one transaction over another and want to ensure its successful 
completion. 
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to a topping bid.174  Accordingly, the conflict of interest and director 
accountability concerns regarding deal protection devices are the same.  
Regardless of the particular analytical framework in which a merger 
occurs, deal protection devices thus lead to the same conflict between 
the contract obligations a target board owes to a bidder and its duties to 
the stockholders in approving the best transaction.175  The Omnicare 
decision erased the artificial line176 between applying enhanced judicial 
scrutiny to deal protection devices in hostile/friendly transactions and 
change-in-control/non-change-in-control transactions.  In closing the 
loop that was negotiated, non-change-in-control mergers the opinion 
emphasizes to the corporate world the importance of director decision-
making in mergers and acquisitions.177 
Second, the decision brought a renewed focus to the role of the 
fiduciary out clause in mergers.178  Important is the fiduciary out 
provision highlighted in Omnicare, which has been characterized as 
advancing both a board’s duty of care and duty of loyalty.  An “out” 
allows a target board to continue to receive information regarding 
potential alternative proposals, thereby providing the board with the 
 174.  See also Coates & Subramanian, supra note 19, at 389 (asserting that “[l]ockups should 
be recognized for what they are – deal protection” and that “[c]ourts should not rubber-stamp 
lockups under the business judgment rule or rely on bright-line rules of thumb to approve lockups”); 
Lebovitch & Morrison, supra note 17, at 14 (contending that all deal protection devices are 
inherently defensive).  Indeed, the fact that many initially (or potentially) hostile transaction may 
morph into friendly, negotiated transactions further supports the contention that using the merger 
context as the dividing line between enhanced scrutiny and business judgment rule review of deal 
protection devices unsound.  See Johnson & Siegel, supra note 128, at 372 n.208 (noting that “there 
is no bright line separating defensive mergers, such as the merger evaluated in Revlon, from 
uncoerced combinations, given that even the threat of a hostile takeover may compel target 
management to consider a negotiated transaction”); Griffith, supra note 8, at 585 n.81. 
 175.  The Omnicare majority recognized this “inherent conflict” in reaching its conclusions.  
See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 930 (Del. 2003); see also Laster, supra 
note 17, at 804-07. 
 176.  Lebovitch & Morrison, supra note 17, at 40-41 (asserting that the dividing line regarding 
the judicial standard of review of board actions in approving a merger is illusory). 
 177.  However, one can argue that Omnicare merely results in a different artificial line with 
respect to what type of enhanced scrutiny applies in change-in-control versus non-change-in-control 
friendly mergers – with Revlon scrutiny applying in the former and Unocal scrutiny (per Omnicare) 
in the latter. 
 178.  The fiduciary out has been defined as a contract provision that “typically provides that if 
some triggering event occurs (often the receipt of a defined ‘Superior Offer’ and sometimes the 
receipt from the corporation’s outside lawyers of an opinion to the effect that the board must as a 
matter of fiduciary duty do an act that the contract forbids or must not do an act the contract 
requires), then the doing of that act (or the refraining from doing a required act) will not constitute a 
breach.”  William T. Allen, Understanding Fiduciary Outs: The What and the Why of an 
Anomalous Concept, 55 BUS. LAW. 653, 654 (2000). 
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information and ability to maximize value for the stockholders.179  A 
fiduciary out provision also promotes the duty of loyalty by preventing 
director self-interest.  The fiduciary out allows a topping bid to come in 
to a target, surpassing any pro-management deal with a preferred bidder 
on lesser terms.180  This provision thus acts as a market check on a target 
board fulfilling its fiduciary obligations to the stockholders to find the 
best transaction.  Moreover, the fiduciary out provision allows a target 
board the flexibility to respond to changes in circumstances beyond a 
superior offer.  Because directors have no fiduciary right under 
Delaware law to breach a contract,181 the fiduciary out provision allows 
target board flexibility in the event circumstances surrounding a target 
change, making a transaction no longer appear to be a reasonable one. 
Finally, Omnicare focused on not just deal protection devices 
individually, but also the combination of devices and their cumulative 
impact.182  Much of the case law pre-Omnicare has been described as 
focusing on “specific deal protection provisions and whether they 
violated a board’s fiduciary duty.  For example, courts analyzed how 
much a termination fee could be in relation to the deal or whether a stock 
lock-up granted in the merger agreement coupled with other protection 
devices was ‘draconian.’”183  While individually, each deal protection 
device may be reasonable, Omnicare drew attention to the overall effect 
that the devices, in combination, have on a board’s ability to continue to 
discharge its fiduciary duties for the benefit of the stockholders. 
 179.  Michael A. Stanchfield, Fiduciary Duties in Negotiated Acquisitions: Questioning the 
Legal Requirements for “Outs,” 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 2261, 2268-69 (2001).  In the absence 
of a fiduciary out, the likelihood that a higher-valuing bidder will make an alternative proposal is 
slim.  As Professors Coates and Subramanian found, deal protection devices can “erect significant 
barriers against outside overbidding” and “foreclos[e] potentially higher value offers.”  Coates & 
Subramanian, supra note 19, at 335-353, 387. 
180.  Stanchfield, supra note 179, at 2268-69. 
 181.  See Allen, supra note 178, at 654-58 (citing Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 
1985)).  It should be noted that a contract entered into in violation of a board’s fiduciary duty has 
been found by the Delaware courts to be void.  Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, 
Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 51 (Del.1994) (“To the extent that a contract, or a provision thereof, purports to 
require a board to act or not act in such a fashion as to limit the exercise of fiduciary duties, it is 
invalid and unenforceable.”).  In contrast, where a board of directors enters into a contract without 
breaching its fiduciary duties, it cannot escape performance under the contract simply by claiming 
that its fiduciary duties require it to do so.  See Transcript of Oral Argument, Global Asset Capital, 
LLC v. Rubicon US Reit, Inc., C.A. No. 5071-VCL, at 6-7 (Del. Ch. Nov. 16, 2009). 
182.  See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 934 (Del. 2003).  Subsequent 
decisions of the Court of Chancery, while not citing to Omnicare, can be seen to apply this 
collective evaluation of deal protection devices.  See, e.g., In re Orchid Cellmark Inc. S’holder 
Litig., No. 6373-VCN, 2011 WL 1938253, at *8 (Del. Ch. May 12, 2012) (“Moreover, it is not 
merely a matter of measuring one deal protection device; one must address the sum of all devices.”). 
183.  Knight, supra note 126, at 49. 
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Following the Court of Chancery’s decisions in Orman, Optima, 
and OPENLANE, which validated alternative transaction structures to 
avoid Omnicare, some commentators asserted that the decision is easy to 
draft around and thus “dead in practice, if not in law.”184  But perhaps 
this misses the point of the decision.  The majority was careful not to 
preclude the use of deal protection devices in total.  In fact, the majority 
pointed out that it would still be acceptable for a transaction to include 
“reasonable structural and economic defenses, incentives and fair 
compensation [to a potential acquirer] if the transaction is not 
completed” as long as the combination of those provisions are not 
impermissibly coercive or preclusive or do not amount to a fait accompli 
that “limit[s] or circumscribe[s] the directors’ fiduciary duties.”185  What 
Omnicare can be said to demand is more careful consideration of one’s 
fiduciary duties by directors and their counsel in negotiating and 
approving mergers, which includes giving attention to how all of the 
provisions work together.186  Because both parties will want their merger 
agreement to be enforceable, the majority’s decision discourages the 
careless overuse of deal protection devices.  Instead, it requires target 
boards and acquirers to consider which deal protection devices may be 
more important to them and which items to forgo.  “For example, the 
acquirer may consider granting the board of the target the right to 
terminate the acquisition agreement if it receives a financially superior 
proposal but retaining the voting agreements.”187  The decision also 
requires parties to not only consider the costs and benefits of each 
provision individually, but also the combined effect of the devices.  In 
184.  See supra notes 158 & 160 and accompanying text. 
 185.  Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 938 see also Stephen I. Glover & Michael J. Scanlon, The 
Landscape for Negotiated Mergers After Omnicare Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc. – What 
Combination of Protective Measures Will Withstand Scrutiny?, SEC. REG. & LAW REPORT (May 26, 
2003), at 893; Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 8, at 1460.  Professor Quinn has advocated that 
limited deal protection devices, such as termination fees, can adequately protect and reimburse 
acquirers’ investments (e.g., direct costs and opportunity costs) in bidding on a target, thus there is 
no need for “bulletproof” transactions.  Quinn, supra note 17, at 867. 
186.  Omnicare’s indirect effect in this regard can be seen in subsequent Delaware decisions 
which evaluate deal protection devices individually and as a whole.  See, e.g., In re Compellent 
Techs., Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 6084–VCL, 2011 WL 6382523, at *23 (Del. Ch. Dec. 9, 
2011); La. Municipal Police Employee’s Ret. Sys. v. Crawford, 918 A.2d 1172, 1181 n.10 (Del. Ch. 
2007); In re Netsmart Techs., Inc. S’holder Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 197 n.80 (Del. Ch. 2007); In re 
Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1014-16 (Del. Ch. 2005). 
 187.  The Omnicare Decision: A Completely Lock-Up Merger Is Invalid Under Delaware Law, 
SIDLEY AUSTIN BROWN & WOOD LLP CORPORATE ALERT (Apr. 28, 2003).  Also, post-Omnicare, 
the boards of directors of the target and acquiring corporations “will need to carefully weigh the 
likelihood of an interloper appearing after an acquisition agreement is signed and the related risk of 
litigation and possible invalidation of the agreement against the desire for certainty of closing.” Id. 
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invalidating the Genesis merger, Omnicare put parties on notice that the 
Delaware courts will invalidate entire contractual provisions where they 
are excessive.  The result being that both a target’s and an acquirer’s 
board will undertake a more thoughtful approach to negotiating deal 
protection so as to achieve an aggressive, but not extreme, combination 
of provisions that will be enforced.188  In contrast, were Delaware courts 
to narrowly interpret target board’s fiduciary duties in the context of deal 
protection devices so as to avoid invalidating the entire provision, it 
would encourage parties to draft aggressive provisions locking-up a 
potential transaction knowing that there is little risk to the merger being 
invalidated.  Requiring boards of directors to take a thoughtful, 
measured approach to negotiating and approving deal protection devices 
has become more and more important as the use of these provisions has 
become increasingly prevalent.189 
B. Director Accountability 
Mergers and acquisitions are very important corporate events.  As 
explained by (former) Chancellor Chandler of the Court of Chancery, 
“[a]ll M&A events are fundamentally extraordinary moments in the life 
of a corporation.  They’re not common, they’re not typical, and they’re 
usually transformative events.”190  Indeed, the negotiated merger is 
likely the most economically significant transaction in the life of a 
corporation.191  Thus it should be no surprise that in connection with 
their duty of care, directors are required to be fully informed in entering 
into such a transaction.192  Included in the decision to enter into a merger 
are a number of considerations, including negotiating and approving deal 
protection devices, that a board must undertake.  In exercising due care a 
board must not only inform itself about the transaction as a whole, but 
188.  See also Yeung & Vincent, supra note 173, at 334-35. 
 189.  See Coates & Subramanian, supra note 19, at 310 (“In friendly U.S. mergers greater than 
$50 million in value, lockups appeared in 80% of the deals in 1998, compared with 40% of deals a 
decade ago.”); Davidoff & Sautter, supra note 151, at 682, 684-92 (discussing the lock-up creep in 
mergers and stating that “[l]ock-ups are also ubiquitous in merger agreements”). 
190.  See Deloitte & Touche LLP, Corporate Development 2012 – Leveraging the Power of 
Relationships in M&A, 31 (2012) [hereinafter Deloitte, Developments]. 
 191.  See Brian C. Brantley, Deal Protection or Deal Preclusion?  A Business Judgment Rule 
Approach to M&A Lockups, 81 TEX. L. REV. 345, 346 (2002). 
 192.  See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. 
Cypress Amax Minerals Co., No. Civ. A. 17398, 1999 WL 1054255 (Del. Ch. Sept. 27, 1999) 
(“Under [Delaware] law, a board of directors must be informed of all material information 
reasonably available . . . [and] even the decision not to negotiate . . . must be an informed one.”); see 
also Stanchfield, supra note 179, at 2272, 2277. 
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also the decision to approve the deal protection devices. 
In the context of no-shop/no-talk provisions, the Court of Chancery 
suggested that provisions designed to restrict a target board from 
communicating with third parties are unlawful because they prevent the 
board from informing itself about whether to negotiate with a third 
party.193  Similarly, locking-up a transaction so that it is a fait accompli, 
contractually forecloses a board’s ability to receive information in 
contravention of its duty of care.  Completely locked-up transactions 
deter, and likely prevent, subsequent bidders from coming forward,194 
thus restricting relevant information regarding the market for a target 
corporation.  Omnicare’s requirement that a target board maintains a 
fiduciary out, and with it the ability to continue to receive relevant 
information regarding alternative bidders and transactions, ensures 
directors carry out their fiduciary obligations in a sale of the business.  
This continuing flow of information is particularly important where a 
target board may not have undertaken (or been able to undertake) an 
adequate analysis of the market and potential acquirers. 
To that end, it should be noted that the majority’s opinion did not 
focus on the controlling stockholder context in which the dispute arose, 
but rather on the role of the board of directors.195  During the years 
surrounding Omnicare there was a movement in corporate America 
toward greater accountability for boards of directors’ decisions.196  The 
majority’s decision fell in line with this accountability movement.  Prior 
decisions such as Revlon and Unocal led to significant changes in 
thinking with respect to the types of deal protection devices a target 
board could agree to as well as the flexibility of a target board in 
agreeing and responding to proposals containing strong deal protection 
 193.  See Phelps Dodge Corp., C.A. 17398, CIV. A. 17383, No. Civ. A. 17427, 1999 WL 
1054255; Ace Ltd. v. Capital Re Corp., 747 A.2d 95, 95 (Del. Ch. 1999); see also Yeung & 
Vincent, supra note 173, at 331-32 (discussing Phelps decision).  But see In re IXC Commc’ns, Inc. 
S’holders Litig., Nos. 17324, 17334, 1999 WL 1009174, at *10 (Del. Ch. Oct. 27, 1999) (applying 
business judgment rule to no-talk). 
194.  See Coates & Subramanian, supra note 19, at 387. 
 195.  Hanewicz, supra note 2, at 564 (“Indeed, a fair reading of the case is that controlling 
shareholders qua controlling shareholders escape with no additional duties.  Instead, the court 
focused on the board.”). 
196.  See Knight, supra note 126, at 48 (“In light of these changes, it seems only natural that 
Omnicare was decided the way it was.”).  Former Chief Justice Veasey has been quoted as stating 
that “a new set of expectations for directors [is] changing how the court looks at these issues” and 
now-Chancellor Strine has noted that “there’s increasing pressure on the court to look at the subject 
of independent directors.”  Loomis, supra note 128, at 3; see also Stanchfield, supra note 179, at 
2272 (stating that Unocal, Van Gorkom, and Revlon “signaled an increased willingness by the 
[Delaware] courts to give less deference to boards of directors’ actions in extraordinary corporate 
transactions”). 
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devices.  Omnicare continued this trend and added another layer to it – 
enhanced scrutiny of decisions involving deal protection devices in the 
negotiated, non-change-in-control merger context.197  In refusing to 
grant deference to the NCS board’s decisions until after applying a more 
substantive review under Unocal, the majority signaled a willingness to 
hold boards of directors more accountable for their decisions in 
connection with negotiating and approving a merger.198 
Moreover, the Omnicare decision can be viewed as an effort by the 
majority to properly shape director decision-making.  Delaware’s 
takeover jurisprudence leading up to and including Omnicare affected 
the thought process on how a board should run a potential acquisition 
from start to finish, with an emphasis on the negotiation of a 
transaction.199  This body of case law developed as a normative/narrative 
style of corporate law, with the courts telling directors, officers, and 
lawyers what kind of behavior is acceptable or a breach of fiduciary 
duty.200  The Omnicare decision contributed to and shaped the definition 
 197.  See Lebovitch & Morrison, supra note 17, at 5-6 (asserting that the application of Unocal 
to deal protection devices “merely requires that directors, as agents, not appear to place their 
allegiance to a potential merger partner ahead of their loyalty to their principals, the stockholders”). 
 198.  This message underlying the majority’s opinion can be continually seen in other merger 
and acquisition opinions of the Delaware courts throughout the ten years following Omnicare.  See, 
e.g., In re Del Monte Goods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813, 835 (Del. Ch. 2011) (stating that 
“the buck stops with the Board”). 
 199.  See Coates & Subramanian, supra note 19, at 312, 320-37 (presenting evidence that 
Delaware case law strongly shapes decisions regarding deal protection devices); cf. Rock, supra 
note 162, at 1100 (concluding that Delaware opinions in the management buyout context seem to 
shape director conduct). 
Indeed, Omnicare came on the heels of four Delaware Supreme Court decisions, all of which 
reversed the Court of Chancery in favor of the plaintiff-stockholders.  See Loomis, supra note 128 
(citing Telxon Corp. v. Meyerson, 802 A.2d 257 (Del. 2002), Saito v. McKesson HBOC Inc., 806 
A.2d 113 (Del. 2002), Levco Alternative Fund Ltd. v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 803 A.2d 428 (Del. 
2002); MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio Inc., 813 A.2d 1118 (Del. 2003)).  These decisions illustrated that 
after “recent corporate management controversies, the public and courts seem to be willing to accept 
more judicial instruction/intrusion upon the decision making of corporate directors and officers.” 
Arons, supra note 76, at 130. 
 200.  This description of takeover jurisprudence is consistent with Professor Edward Rock’s 
proposed theory on how Delaware corporate law works – operating as a “norm-based” account of 
managerial behavior supported by the Delaware courts’ decisions, which also serve as a “source of 
gossip, criticism and sanction for this set of actors who are beyond the reach of the firm’s normal 
system of social control.” Rock, supra note 162, at 1012-13, 1105 (describing the “Delaware 
judicial style as one well suited to the articulation and expression of standards of managerial 
conduct”).  Professor Rock describes Delaware fiduciary duty law as having a “normative narrative 
style.”  Id. at 1063.  Using the management buyout (MBO) jurisprudence as a case study in which to 
watch Delaware corporate law in action (see id. at 1019), Professor Rock found that the standards 
governing MBOs evolved through decisions where the court provided guidance on the appropriate 
standards of behavior by describing the good and bad performances by directors.  Id. at 1063.  This 
same development and articulation of the proper standards of director conduct can be seen in 
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and description of the role that directors are expected to fill in 
negotiating and approving mergers, by providing guidance on the 
decisional process necessary in approving deal protection devices. 
In particular, two of Omnicare’s holdings can be regarded as efforts 
by the majority to improve decision-making by boards of directors.  The 
first holding is the majority’s application of enhanced scrutiny under 
Unocal to a board’s decision to approve deal protection devices.201  In 
applying enhanced scrutiny, the majority signaled to the corporate world 
the importance in negotiating each aspect of a merger regardless of the 
context.  The direct effect of the application of more meaningful judicial 
scrutiny to board action is more careful director decision-making.202  To 
satisfy substantive judicial review of their decisions to approve deal 
protection devices as dictated by Omnicare, boards and their advisors 
must engage in informed and thoughtful deliberations and consideration 
of these provisions.  Encouraging this type of fulsome discussion in the 
boardroom builds consensus among directors, as well as leads to thicker, 
more robust decisions by the board.203  The result is an actively engaged 
board that negotiates for and approves the best possible transaction and 
structure for its stockholders.204 
Second, after concluding that approval of the provisions did not 
satisfy Unocal scrutiny, the majority held that the deal protection 
devices were invalid and unenforceable.205  As previously discussed, in 
invalidating the merger provisions entirely, as opposed to enforcing part 
Delaware’s takeover jurisprudence, and in particular in the majority’s Omnicare decision. 
201.  See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 934-35 (Del. 2003). 
 202.  See Coates & Subramanian, supra note 19, at 336-37 (concluding that Delaware case law 
has “a significant impact on the incidence and design of lockups” and that “[a]t a general level, 
lockup incidence is affected strongly by whether a given deal is subject to the type of ‘enhanced 
scrutiny’ announced in Revlon, with lockups being more likely and breakup fees being larger 
outside the borders of Revlon-land”). 
203.  In this respect, the normative implications of Omnicare are similar to Smith v. Van 
Gorkom, with the majority opinion in each case emphasizing the necessity of an informed, careful 
process in director decision-making.  See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985); 
see also Rock, supra note 162, at 1015 (noting that Delaware conceptualizes fiduciary duty law in 
process terms).  Thus, Omnicare can be read as respecting the board’s institutional competence if 
the board’s decisional process in approving deal protection devices meets certain standards. 
 204.  Recently it was reported that more than 40 percent of corporate executives surveyed 
regarding the role of boards of directors in merger and acquisition activity believe that directors 
have become more involved in these transactions over the last two years.  See Deloitte, 
Developments, supra note 190, at 27.  And fifty-four percent of corporate executives at corporations 
with at least $1 billion in annual revenue believe that this board involvement adds value “through 
constructive evaluation of and challenges to transaction objectives.”  Id. at 29-30 (internal 
quotations omitted).  At smaller corporations, only 31 percent of corporate executives held this 
same view.  Id. 
205.  See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 936. 
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or all of the provisions by applying a narrow interpretation, the 
majority’s decision encourages thoughtful consideration and negotiation 
of these provisions.206  With a heightened focus to make sure 
combinations of deal provisions are enforceable, target boards and 
acquirers are deterred from agreeing to overbroad prohibitive deal 
protection devices.  Rather, to avoid invalidation of contractual merger 
restrictions under Omnicare, boards of directors and their advisors must 
now put forth the time and effort to engage in vigorous negotiations of 
deal protection devices, approving only those that are more narrowly 
tailored to achieve the parties’ objectives. 
C. Precommitment Is Not Necessarily a Good Thing 
Is the value of precommitment overstated?  Many scholars and 
practitioners assert that the ability to completely lock-up a transaction is 
necessary to have an efficient buyer-seller market.207  But do the costs 
and preclusive effect of a locked-up deal outweigh the gains asserted?208  
This is an issue on which neither commentators nor the justices in 
Omnicare themselves, could agree.  As former Chief Justice Veasey has 
subsequently commented, Omnicare represents an intellectual 
disagreement over whether a transaction can ever be absolutely locked-
up.209 
From the stockholder perspective, the costs of complete lock-ups 
seem to be outweighed by the benefits.  In fact, many of the benefits 
proponents of precommitment strategies proffer inure to other 
constituencies such as the board of directors and potential acquirers, 
which does not necessarily benefit the stockholders.  For instance, deal 
protection devices increase a target board’s control over the sale 
process.210  In theory, this control enables a target board to maximize 
stockholder value. 
206.  See supra Part V.A. 
 207.  See Griffith, supra note 8, at 595-614; supra note 137; see also Meredith M. Brown & 
William D. Regner, What’s Happening to the Business Judgment Rule?, CORP. & SEC. LAW 
ADVISOR, Aug. 2003, at 5; J. Travis Laster, The Omnicare Opinion: A New Rule From Delaware?, 
CORP. & SEC. LAW ADVISOR, May 2003, at 16-17. 
208.  See Quinn, supra note 17, at 865-67 (asserting that from an economic perspective that 
completely locked-up transactions in the non-Revlon context are not as beneficial as asserted by 
proponents of precommitment and arguing that boards’ abilities to approve deal protections devices 
should be limited); Laster, supra note 17, at 828-29; see also Moceri, supra note 128, at 1159-60 
(questioning whether the benefits of lock-ups outweigh the detriments and asserting that other 
defensive provisions such as termination fees, sufficiently protect bidders). 
209.  Veasey, supra note 161, at 172. 
210.  See Griffith, supra note 8, at 615. 
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However, deal protection provisions also increase target directors’ 
ability to commit to a transaction that puts their own interest ahead of 
those of their shareholders.  Large scale acquisition transactions, in 
particular, may create strong incentives for target directors to act in 
pursuit of their own selfish interest because such transactions throw 
target directors and managers into a last period problem.211 
Indeed, scholars have found that in the merger context target 
management and directors are willing to accept lower prices in exchange 
for personal benefits in the transactions (e.g., additional compensation, 
continuing employment, or board seats) or the guarantee that the 
transaction will close and the merger consideration will be paid (as 
opposed to a riskier, but higher, offer).212 
The problem with a completely locked-up transaction is that it 
eliminates the ability of the market to act as a check on this incentive for 
director and manager selfishness.  Deal protection devices not only 
insulate an acquirer’s bid, but also target directors and managers from 
competition in the market for corporate control.213  Once a transaction 
has become locked-up, the possibility of alternative, superior bidders 
emerging is essentially, if not actually, eliminated.  This, too, eliminates 
the disciplinary effect of the acquisition market.  In the case of target 
directors and managers, their self-serving approval of a transaction that 
maximizes their interests is shielded from later bids that may not provide 
the same benefits.  In requiring a fiduciary out, Omnicare preserves a 
market check, which eliminates, at least to some extent, the potential for 
directors and managers to act self-interestedly in maximizing their own 
welfare to the detriment of the stockholders. 
Omnicare’s optionality not only improves stockholder value in this 
governance sense, but also in an economic sense.  In requiring a 
fiduciary out, the opinion ensures that target stockholders receive the 
initial transaction and the potential that a later, superior offer, may 
emerge.  In fact, the most important time for a target corporation with 
respect to receiving higher-value proposals can occur after an initial 
merger agreement is signed and announced.  During the time that passes 
between the signing of the merger agreement and stockholder approval 
211.  Id. 
 212.  See Jay C. Hartzell, et al., What’s in It for Me? CEOs Whose Firms Are Acquired, 17 
REV. FIN. STUD. 37, 51-56 (2004) (finding target management exchange lower premiums for 
generous compensations packages); Julie Wulf, Do CEOs in Mergers Trade Power for Premium? 
Evidence from Mergers of Equals, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 60, 94 (2004) (finding target management 
exchanges lower premiums for employment in the surviving entity). 
213.  See Griffith, supra note 8, at 616; Kahan & Klausner, supra note 128, at 1560 & 1563. 
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of the deal, several months may go by (at least in the case of public 
corporations), during which interlopers may make a competitive bid.214  
The reason that this time can be so important is that announcement of a 
pending transaction can signal to the market that a corporation may be 
more favorable than originally thought.215  Following Omnicare, target 
corporations are not limited to only those bids that are made during the 
negotiation or auction period, but have a longer window in which to 
receive the highest possible value.  In preventing transactions from being 
a fait accompli, Omnicare preserves this period of time as one in which 
the superior proposal concept has actual meaning and must be enforced.  
Thus, the fiduciary out leaves a transaction open for additional bidders to 
compete for a target.  This competition, as well as merely the possibility 
of competition for a target, can lead to additional value for a target and 
its stockholders.216 
In addition, proponents of precommitment assert that preserving the 
ability to completely lock-up a transaction creates an incentive for 
potential acquirers to search for targets and make a bid in the first 
place.217  This is because, proponents argue, there are substantial costs 
associated with evaluating a target and making a bid.  The ability to 
completely lock-up a bid mitigates the possibility that these costs will be 
214.  See Brantley, supra note 191, at 346; Jim Mallea, Timing to Close – Tender Offers vs. 
Mergers, FACTSET MERGERS (Feb. 24, 2010), 
https://www.mergermetrics.com/marequest?an=dt.getPage&st=1&pg=/pub/rs_20100224.html&Tim
ing_to_close_Tender_Offers_vs_Mergers&rnd=476844  (stating that the average number of days it 
took to complete a merger for 2009 was 111.85); see also Coates & Subramanian, supra note 19, at 
310 (noting that “compliance with disclosure and other rules regulating the process of obtaining 
target shareholder acceptance or approval entails delay, ranging from a minimum of thirty days up 
to six months in some situations”). 
 215.  See Moceri, supra note 128, at 1171-72 (arguing that allowing lock-ups eliminates the 
important time between the merger agreement and the stockholder vote which then also eliminates 
the chance that a higher bid could be made; all at the stockholders’ expense). 
 216.  See Celia R. Taylor, “A Delicate Interplay”: Resolving the Contract and Corporate Law 
Tension in Mergers, 74 TUL. L. REV. 561, 594 (1999) (“Under basic rules of supply and demand, 
the fewer the bidders, the lower the final price paid.”); Quinn, supra note 17, at 879-80.  
Precommitment strategies do not necessarily, as proponents asserted, lead to bidders paying a higher 
price for the extra protection afforded by a complete lock-up.  Rather, as Brian JM Quinn, explains: 
[t]he reason buyers often insist on bulletproofing a transaction may be because they un-
derstand that by limiting competition they can accomplish the transaction for less than 
their private valuation, thereby retaining more surplus. Bulletproofing may sometimes be 
defended as innocuous when the buyer is the “only game in town.”  However, if the 
probability of a subsequent bid were zero, or close to it, then rational buyers would not 
be willing to offer any increase in price in exchange for bulletproofing. 
Id. at 880 (also pointing out that “negotiations that are open to topping bids are better for sellers 
than bulletproof transactions”). 
217.  See Hanewicz, supra note 2, at 559-60; Moceri, supra note 128, at 1166-67. 
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lost if an interloper emerges to break up the deal.218  However, there are 
strong counterarguments that compensatory deal protection devices such 
as termination fees can adequately address the costs bidders incur in 
making a bid, thus generating initial bids without the need for a 
complete lock-up.219  As Professor Brian JM Quinn explains in arguing 
in favor of a mandatory rule against complete lock-ups, compensatory 
devices such as termination fees not only cover the costs of a bidder’s 
transaction-specific investments, thus attracting initial bids for a target 
corporation, they can also spur competition for the target, creating the 
potential for the highest-valuing bid to emerge.220 
More importantly, in contrast to complete lock-ups that encourage 
bidders in the initial stages of a sale process, Omnicare can be viewed as 
encouraging additional bidders to participate in the sale process at all 
stages, including after an initial merger agreement is executed.  The 
majority’s opinion put bidders on notice that the Delaware courts may 
not enforce a merger agreement if it lacks a fiduciary out when a 
superior offer emerges.221  Moreover, requiring a fiduciary out means 
that subsequent bidders will not have to challenge the locked-up merger 
agreement in court to have a chance at the deal – instead, the merger 
agreement will provide how the subsequent bid may be considered and 
accepted by the target board and stockholders.222  Encouraging (and 
allowing for) competing offers, which may lead to a superior one, at all 
stages of the sale process increases the potential for higher stockholder 
value.223 
 218.  See Griffith, supra note 8, at 613; Hanewicz, supra note 2, at 559-60; Moceri, supra note 
128, at 1166-67. 
 219.  See Quinn, supra note 17, at 881 (arguing that limited compensatory devices, alone, are 
sufficient to accomplish the objectives that have previously been used to justify complete lock-ups). 
220.  Id. at 881. 
 221.  See In re OPENLANE, C.A. No. 6849–VCN, 2011 WL 4599662, at *10 n.53 (Del. Ch. 
Sept. 30, 2011). 
222.  See Paul L. Regan, Great Expectations? A Contract Law Analysis for Preclusive 
Corporate Lock-Ups, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 5 (1999) (noting that a subsequent bidder is either 
unable to make a bid or must make its bid conditional upon judicial invalidation of the lock-up 
provisions). 
 223.  See Moceri, supra note 128, at 1181-82 (describing the bidding war between Viacom and 
QVC for Paramount as an example of how bidding wars may increase the value stockholders of a 
target company receives).  Of course, there is the possibility that such competition could end in a 
target losing both possible deals.  It should be noted, however, that Omnicare does not eliminate 
deal protection devices generally (see supra note 153 and accompanying text), and thus a target may 
still protect its “bird in hand” with deal protection devices from such an event so long as this 
protection is not absolute.  Further, Delaware courts have been clear that boards of directors may 
validly reject superior, but more risky, bids for the corporation.  See Transcript of Oral Argument, 
Optima Int’l of Miami v. WCI Steel, Inc., C.A. No. 3833-VCL, at 127 (Del. Ch. June 27, 2008) 
(upholding the board’s decision to recommend the lower-but-more-certain bid over the higher-but-
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D. Protection of Minority Stockholders 
Throughout its decision, the Omnicare majority was concerned 
about the rights of minority stockholders.  In describing the fiduciary 
duties a board owes to its stockholders, the majority stated that they 
were “unremitting” and must be discharged “at all times.”224  This meant 
that (1) the “NCS board was required to contract for an effective 
fiduciary out clause to exercise its continuing fiduciary responsibilities 
to the minority stockholders,” and (2), Genesis’ contractual expectations 
in protecting its merger “must yield to the supervening responsibilities of 
the directors to discharge their fiduciary duties on a continuing basis” to 
minority stockholders.225  In finding the deal protection devices to be 
invalid and unenforceable, the court appears to be motivated by an 
interest to protect the minority stockholders.  It achieved this by making 
clear that a board of directors’ fiduciary obligations include an 
obligation to protect stockholder interests throughout the entire merger 
process. 
In reaching its holdings, the majority also recognized that 
stockholders play an important, and indeed, statutorily-prescribed role in 
mergers and acquisitions.226  This is because these types of transactions 
more-risky bid).  Thus, discretion is still left with the target board to determine what the best deal is 
for the corporation and stockholders, which may be the original bidder. 
 In addition to the economic value associated with enticing and potentially securing a later, 
superior bid, Omnicare’s requirement for optionality in a merger agreement may also provide target 
boards with bargaining power.  As between target corporations and acquirers, bidding corporations 
generally have greater bargaining power.  See Quinn, supra note 17, at 882-84.  The majority’s 
decision gives target boards a legal basis to refuse overly aggressive, locked-up proposals.  While 
some critics argue that the inability to be able to agree to a lock-up results in a loss of negotiating 
value to target boards, the flip side can also be argued – because Omnicare forbids it, target boards 
are now able to preserve the ability to accept a higher, subsequent bid without having to give 
something up in exchange for this optionality (e.g., a lower price, higher termination fee, less 
favorable terms).  See Stanchfield, supra note 179, at 2285-86 (asserting that that the lack of a 
fiduciary out provision may “shift bargaining power form target corporations to acquirers”); see 
also Moceri, supra note 128, at 1177-80.  In particular where a target corporation is in financial 
distress, providing the board with this additional bargaining leverage is important.  See Laster, supra 
note 17, at 796, 832 (explaining that “The Omnicare pre-commitment rule operates similarly by 
taking away the board’s ability to agree to an absolute lockup in a context where the board is 
unlikely to be able to resist.”). 
224.  Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 938-39 (Del. 2003). 
 225.  Id. at 939; see also Neimeth & Reese, supra note 102, at 4. (“Of course, the Omnicare 
decision [was] but the latest in a string of Delaware Supreme Court decisions that . . .  reversed the 
Chancery Court decisions in the name of stockholder activism and minority stockholder 
protection.”); Arons, supra note 76, at 130; Panagopoulos, supra note 11, at 469. 
226.  Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 930; see also 8 Del. C. § 251 (requiring stockholder adoption of a 
merger agreement); 8 Del. C. § 271 (requiring stockholder approval of a sale of all or substantially 
all of a corporation’s assets). 
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implicate stockholder ownership rights.  The majority explained, “the 
Delaware corporation law expressly provides for a balance of power 
between boards and stockholders which makes a merger transaction a 
shared enterprise and ownership decision.”227  This balance of power is 
provided for statutorily, giving the board the authority to negotiate and 
execute a merger agreement while vesting the ultimate approval of a 
transaction with the stockholders.228 
To ensure a proper balance between these two groups, the 
majority’s decision limited deal protection devices and shifted power 
from the board to the stockholders.  First, the majority held that 
Unocal’s enhanced scrutiny was the proper standard of review for a 
board’s approval of deal protection devices.  In contrast to the deference 
afforded to a board’s decision under the business judgment rule, 
enhanced judicial scrutiny entails the court taking a closer look at the 
deal protection measures and their effect as well as the board’s 
motivations in approving them.  This type of considered review allows 
the court to make certain that there is a proper balance between the 
interests of the stockholders and board in approving deal protection 
devices.229  In addition, enhanced scrutiny is particularly important in 
situations like Omnicare that involve a controlling stockholder or group 
with the requisite voting power to unilaterally approve a transaction, 
leaving minority stockholders without the ability to approve or reject the 
deal.  Where minority stockholders’ voting rights are, as a practical 
matter, a nullity, it can be important for the court to engage in a more 
substantive review of the merger provisions to ensure that the board is 
properly discharging its fiduciary obligations and acting in the best 
interests of all of the stockholders and not just the controllers.230 
 227.  Omnicare, 818 A.3d at 930; see Coates & Subramanian, supra note 19, at 387 (“On the 
other hand, the very reason that the law requires a period of vulnerability between signing and 
shareholder approval – i.e., that shareholders and not directors bear the risks and costs of ownership, 
and retain important veto rights over significant transactions – should indicate the limit of 
lockups.”). 
 228.  See 8 Del. C. § 251.  As explained by Professors Coates and Subramanian, “The primary 
policy justification for this set of legal rules is that shareholders should have some power over 
fundamental corporate transactions, presumably to minimize agency costs.”  Coates & 
Subramanian, supra note 19, at 310 n.4. 
 229.  Relatedly, Delaware practitioners Mark Lebovitch and Peter Morrison have asserted that 
the majority’s opinion in Omnicare is a move back to a more robust Unocal standard of review, 
effectively shifting the power back to the stockholders by engaging in a substantive review of 
boards’ decisions.  Lebovitch & Morrison, supra note 17, at 46-47. 
 230.  Of course, in any case where a controlling stockholder or group is on both sides of a 
transaction, or receiving any special benefits not otherwise shared by all stockholders, entire 
fairness will apply.  See, e.g., Frank v. Elgamal, C.A. No. 6120–VCN, 2012 WL 1096090 (Del. Ch. 
Mar. 30, 2012); In re S. Peru Copper Corp. S’holder Derivative Litig., 30 A.3d 60 opinion revised 
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Second, the majority’s focus on the duties directors owe to minority 
stockholders can be characterized as protecting voting rights, in 
particular, in situations like mergers where stockholders are statutorily 
given approval rights.  The combination of deal protection devices in the 
Genesis merger agreement rendered approval of the transaction a 
mathematical certainty, which in turn rendered any stockholder vote a 
moot point.231  In holding that a board could not completely lock-up a 
transaction, the majority prevented a board from contractually 
diminishing the stockholders’ role in the process of selling the 
corporation.  This, in effect, shifted power back to the stockholders in 
ensuring that final approval of a merger rested with the stockholder vote, 
and not board approval of contractual provisions.232 
Besides the reasons expressly articulated by the majority in 
Omnicare, protection of minority stockholders is often necessary due to 
differing risk preferences that exist between public minority 
stockholders and controlling stockholders in selling a corporation.  A 
controlling stockholder, often with heavy influence on the board, may 
prefer, and thus want to protect, one proposed transaction over another. 
Public stockholders are likely to have more diversified holdings than a 
controlling stockholder.  As a result, the minority public stockholders 
generally will prefer a riskier, but also higher value, transaction.233  In 
contrast, less diversified controlling stockholders will generally prefer 
the safer, but lower value, transaction.234  This means that a controlling 
and superseded, 52 A.3d 761 (Del. Ch. 2011) judgment entered sub nom.  In re S. Peru Copper 
Corp., CIV. A. 961-CS, 2011 WL 6382006 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 2011) vacated sub nom. In re S. Peru 
Copper Corp. S’holder Derivative Litig., 961-CS, 2011 WL 6476919 (Del. Ch. Dec. 22, 2011) This 
was not the case in Omnicare, which involved a negotiated, non-change-in-control transaction and 
the controlling stockholders were not on both sides of the transaction. 
231.  Knight, supra note 126, at 48. 
 232.  See also Moceri, supra note 128, at 1175-76 (“Although the shareholders have the 
ultimate vote on whether a merger or acquisition is consummated, lockup provisions act as a way to 
lead the shareholders in a certain direction, or at the very least add another variable to consider that 
does not relate to the merits of the transaction.  Since such deal protection devices are entered into 
and negotiated by the directors, they have a strong influence on the outcome of a proposed 
merger.”). 
233.  See Ronald A. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Controlling Controlling Shareholders, 152 
U. PA. L. REV. 785, 816 n.115 (2003) (noting that public stockholders are generally diversified and, 
as a result, risk neutral); see also Henry T.C. Hu, New Financial Products, the Modern Process of 
Financial Innovation, and the Puzzle of Shareholder Welfare, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1273, 1307 (1991) 
(stating that “investors can substantially eliminate their exposure to unsystematic risk through the 
simple expedient of buying a large enough number of stocks”). 
 234.  See Richard A. Booth, Stockholders, Stakeholders, and Bagholders (or How Investor 
Diversification Affects Fiduciary Duty), 53 BUS. LAW. 429, 442 (1998) (“In short, an undiversified 
stockholder is risk-averse.”); Gilson & Gordon, supra note 233, at 816 n.115 (noting that 
controlling stockholders are generally undiversified and thus risk-averse).  Wayne O. Hanewicz has 
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stockholder is more likely to support and want to protect the safer 
transaction – a result that does not necessarily align with the interests of 
public stockholders.  These differing risk preferences clearly impact 
decisions surrounding deal protection devices, including controlling 
stockholders agreeing to measures such as voting agreements.  This 
result may explain why the Omnicare majority emphasized directors’ 
fiduciary obligations and having a more fulsome process in negotiating, 
considering, and approving deal protection devices – to remind boards 
that they should act in the best interests of all stockholders and not favor 
one group over another.  Further addressing this issue, the majority’s 
opinion also focused on the timing of controlling stockholders’ vote on 
the merger, seeking to have all stockholders voting on the merger at the 
same time, thus aligning their risk preferences.235 
E. The Benefits of a Per Se Rule 
A per se rule has both inherent drawbacks236 and benefits.  The 
most obvious benefit of this type of rule is clarity for those who must 
follow it.  In establishing a per se ban on completely locked-up 
transactions that lack a fiduciary out, Omnicare did just that.  This was 
in contrast to prior deal protection jurisprudence, which had been 
criticized as inconsistent and lacking legal clarity.237  Professors Coates 
and Subramanian have explained the problem with pre-Omnicare 
jurisprudence as follows: “[l]ockup doctrine . . . has more of the 
character of a standard than a rule (or set of rules), with the costs that 
standards entail: greater litigation costs; greater error of application, and 
also noted that risk-averse preferences of controlling stockholders may also be due to the face that 
they are substantially more exposed than minority public stockholders to entity-specific or 
“unsystematic risk.”  Hanewicz, supra note 2, at 544-46.  Thus, in the case of Omnicare, “[t]he 
unsystematic risk that Outcalt and Shaw faced by refusing to grant a complete lock-up was the 
possibility that Genesis would walk away and leave Omnicare to acquire NCS for a lower price.” 
Id. at 543-44. 
 235.  See Davis, supra note 16, at 200-01 (discussing the differences in the risk preferences 
between controlling stockholders and public minority stockholders and that Omnicare’s focus on 
the timing of the controlling stockholder vote on the merger at the same time as the public 
stockholders aligns these preferences); Hanewicz, supra note 2, at 546. 
236.  See Part III.A.4. 
 237.  See Griffith, Last Period of Play, supra note 148, at 1904 (asserting that Delaware 
decisions regarding deal protection devices are “inconsistent not only with prior Delaware 
jurisprudence but also with each other” and that “[t]he Chancery Court’s deal protection decisions 
introduce a lack of legal clarity into an area of high economic stakes”); Gregory V. Varallo & 
Srinivas M. Raju, A Fresh Look at Deal Protection Devices: Out from the Shadow of the 
Omnipresent Specter, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 975, 982 (2001) (noting the inconsistencies in deal 
protection case law). 
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resulting uncertainty; and at the margin more desirable and less desirable 
conduct, with associated decreases in efficiency.”238  Thus, the benefit of 
the majority setting forth a per se rule on complete lock-ups, as opposed 
to a standard, is that the rule is more precise and easy to follow, while a 
standard would have required factual analysis and, as a result, be less 
clear and more complex.  Following Omnicare, corporations and their 
counsel have clear guidance on negotiating and approving merger 
agreements that will be enforced by the courts.239  Such a clear rule also 
limits the judicial burden in enforcing it.240  And, in fact, this has been 
the case, as illustrated by only a handful of Omnicare-based challenges 
being filed in the past ten years.241 
Of course, the rigidity in application of per se rules can pose 
problems, especially in a field as dynamic and varied as corporate 
acquisitions.  Recognizing this, the Omnicare court tried to narrowly 
tailor its holding to apply only to complete lock-ups (i.e., those 
combinations of deal protection devices that result in a fait accompli).  
Despite invalidating the offending provisions in the NCS-Genesis 
merger agreement, the court stressed that deal protection devices 
generally would not be invalidated under its analysis.242  As summarized 
by one commentator, post-Omnicare, “a mere impediment to competing 
transactions is [not] enough; something more – much more – should be 
required.”243  In addition, the majority limited its holdings to the merger 
context, distinguishing other types of transactions where precommitment 
strategies may still be used.244  The Omnicare decision was not an 
attempt to set forth a sweeping rule requiring fiduciary out provisions 
and thereby invalidating all precommitment strategies.  Rather, the 
majority intended to provide a narrowly tailored, targeted rule in the 
238.  Coates & Subramanian, supra note 19, at 384. 
 239.  See E. Norman Veasey, The Roles of the Delaware Courts in Merger and Acquisition 
Litigation, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 849, 855 (2001) (stating that one of the goals of the Delaware courts 
is to “[a]chieve stability and predictability for the benefit of corporate planners and trial courts”). 
240.  See Hanewicz, supra note 2, at 554 (stating that “the clarity of the rule should limit the 
judicial burden of enforcing it . . . , but if the court had upheld or invalidated the measures based on 
more flexible reasonableness grounds, many new cases almost certainly would result”).  It has also 
been suggested that the per se rule in Omnicare may be a reflection of the court’s perception of 
some of the weaknesses of the judiciary as a decision-maker.  Id. 
 241.  See supra Part V (discussing the three Omnicare-based challenges brought in Delaware 
since the decision in 2003). 
242.  See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 938-39 (Del. 2003). 
243.  Hanewicz, supra note 2, at 554-55. 
244.  See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 939 n.88 (explaining that other “contracts do not require a 
fiduciary out clause because they involve business judgments that are within the exclusive province 
of the board of directors’ power to manage the affairs of the corporation”); Hanewicz, supra note 2, 
at 561-62. 
50
Akron Law Review, Vol. 47 [2014], Iss. 3, Art. 4
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol47/iss3/4
2014] “BAD LAW, BAD ECONOMICS AND BAD POLICY” 803 
merger context to address its concerns with board’s restricting 
themselves (and stockholders) in extraordinary transactions. 
VI. IS OMNICARE EFFICIENT?
A decision’s holding and rationale may establish normatively 
“good” rules; however, it does not necessarily mean that such a rule is 
efficient.  For purposes of assessing the “efficiency” of Omnicare’s 
normative contributions, this article asks specifically: Do the gains to 
stockholders by having directors take the steps suggested by the court in 
its opinion exceed the costs?  In its majority opinion, the Delaware 
Supreme Court was conveying to corporate America its view on how 
directors should function in negotiating and approving mergers and 
acquisitions, with a particular emphasis on deal protection devices.  To 
that end Omnicare provides a road map as to the preferred steps boards 
of directors should follow.  For example, the majority’s holdings suggest 
boards of directors engage in thoughtful consideration of deal protection 
devices (both individually and collectively), fulsome negotiations of 
merger terms, and consideration of all stockholder interests (in particular 
minority stockholders).  In sum, the Omnicare majority’s opinion is a 
clear process-oriented decision, emphasizing the appropriate decisional 
course to be followed in negotiating and approving mergers and 
acquisitions. 
So what gains do the court’s suggested decision-making practices 
provide to stockholders?  One such gain would seem to be lower 
litigation costs for corporations.  To the extent that a board undertakes a 
proper process per Omnicare, the Delaware courts will respect the 
board’s institutional competence and uphold its decisions.  In addition, 
stockholders receive gains from the more informed and comprehensive 
decision-making by a board of directors that Omnicare encourages.  This 
type of decision-making leads to thicker, more robust board decisions. 
And an actively engaged board will also be more likely to negotiate for 
and approve the best possible transaction and structure for its 
stockholders.  Further, the preservation of optionality arising from 
Omnicare’s fiduciary out requirement can lead to both economic and 
corporate governance benefits to stockholders.245  Lastly, the clarity 
provided by Omnicare’s per se rule against complete lock-ups allows for 
greater certainty and predictability for corporations and their counsel 
with respect to the enforceability of merger agreements. 
245.  See supra notes 213-23 and accompanying text. 
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Conversely, the costs that stockholders may incur due to 
Omnicare’s suggested directorial decision-making process can include 
the additional time and money arising from a more detailed board 
process and creating a good paper trail with respect to merger 
negotiations and board approval (e.g., expert fees, attorneys’ fees and 
additional board meetings).  These increased decision-making costs of 
the board of directors – by requiring boards to collect information and 
engage in dialogue or negotiations that might not always be relevant to a 
reasoned determination – can significantly delay the board’s decision, 
which can be particularly costly where a decision is required within a 
relatively short time frame.  Thus, the costs to stockholders created by 
Omnicare’s informed, fulsome decisions may, at least in certain 
instances, mitigate or outweigh the gains from lower litigation costs.  
Other potential costs to stockholders come from Omnicare’s per se ban 
on completely locked-up deals.  In establishing such a rule the court took 
away the board’s flexibility to structure a transaction that, while being 
completely locked-up, may also secure the only and best transaction 
available deal for stockholders.  More importantly, this holding of the 
court results in the loss of precommitment strategies, their negotiating 
value, and the economic value in complete deal certainty, all of which 
proponents of precommitment assert is very high.246 
What appears to be the likely sticking point in evaluating 
Omnicare’s efficiency – weighing the gains to stockholders against the 
costs – is the value of precommitment.  Where one believes in, and 
highly values, the ability to completely commit to a transaction, 
Omnicare results in large costs to stockholders.  On the other hand, if 
one does not place such a high value on precommitment strategies then 
the gains to stockholders resulting from Omnicare’s holdings and 
rationale, would seem to outweigh the costs.  If one assumes the goal of 
improving corporate governance in M&A is maximization of 
stockholder value, empirically determining the value of precommitment, 
and thus Omnicare’s efficiency, would appear to be possible.  The 
results of prior scholarship that have looked at precommitment strategies 
in mergers from this perspective, however, have come to opposite 
conclusions.247  Such results indicate that the value of precommitment is, 
246.  See supra Part III.B. 
 247.  Compare Griffith, supra note 8, at 606-13 (applying game theory simulations to 
precommitment strategies and concluding that precommitment is a valuable tool in merger 
negotiations), and Kennedy, supra note 139, at 6 (asserting that an economist will tell you that a 
fiduciary out option has a price because target stockholders will receive a lower initial deal price), 
with Quinn, supra note 17, at 865-67, 880 (asserting that from an economic perspective, completely 
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in fact, empirically difficult to pinpoint. 
Accordingly, this article looks at the question of Omnicare’s 
efficiency from a more theoretical perspective.  As discussed in Part 
V.C., there exists a clear intellectual disagreement in corporate law 
regarding the value and necessity of the ability to precommit in mergers 
and acquisitions.248  While it is clear that Omnicare impacted and shaped 
today’s corporate law environment and M&A practices in what this 
article contends is a positive manner, whether these changes are, in the 
end, efficient comes down to what side of the precommitment argument 
one falls.  From the stockholder perspective, the preservation of 
optionality has important corporate governance and economic 
benefits.249  Further, while the elimination of a target board’s ability to 
completely lock-up a potential transaction results in some loss (although 
the extent of such loss is arguable) to target stockholders, this can be 
easily mitigated through the use of other deal protection devices.  In 
particular, it has been suggested that alternative mechanisms such as 
compensatory deal protection devices can achieve many of the benefits 
of a completely locked-up transaction.250  Thus, the gains that inure to 
stockholders as a result of Omnicare’s preservation of optionality in 
mergers may very well outweigh any losses resulting from the 
elimination of precommitment, making the decision’s normative impact 
on corporate law an efficient one. 
VII. CONCLUSION
At the time of its issuance, and still today, Omnicare is viewed as 
one of the most controversial mergers and acquisitions decisions.  
Indeed, the majority’s opinion was immediately met with widespread 
locked-up transactions in the non-Revlon context are not as beneficial as asserted by proponents of 
precommitment), Coates & Subramanian, supra note 19, at 335-53, 387 (finding that deal protection 
devices “foreclos[e] potentially higher value offers”), and Moceri, supra note 128, at 1166-67 
(stating that lock-ups “do not affect the value that a bidder gives” to a target corporation; rather they 
reduce “the price paid for the target company”).  The difficulty in empirically evaluating whether 
corporate law principles result in value to stockholders has also been noted in other contexts.  
Compare Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, What Matters in Corporate Governance?, 
22 REV. FIN. STUD. 783, 813-17 (2009) (finding statistically significant negative correlations 
between managerial entrenchment and stockholder wealth during the 1990s), with Jay B. Kesten, 
Managerial Entrenchment and Shareholder Wealth Revisited: Theory Evidence from a 
Recessionary Financial Market, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1609, 1647 (2010-11) (finding that previous 
statistical correlations between managerial entrenchment and stockholders wealth disappeared 
entirely during the financial crisis from 2007-2008). 
248.  See supra Part V.C. 
249.  See id. (discussing the governance, economic and negotiating benefits of optionality). 
250.  See Quinn, supra note 17, at 881; Moceri, supra note 128, at 1159-60. 
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criticism, which included two of the justices on the court.  The 
majority’s rationale and holdings have been heavily attacked for their 
questionable doctrinal footing and bad corporate policy implications. 
Further, there was significant concern that Omnicare’s ban on 
precommitment strategies would stunt merger growth by discouraging 
potential bidders or, at a minimum, causing bidders to offer lower prices 
and decreasing acquisition value for targets and their stockholders. 
In revisiting Omnicare ten years later, however, it does not appear 
to have led to the detrimental consequences that many predicted.  
Merger and acquisition activity did not significantly decrease in the 
years that followed the decision, nor did the use of the deal protection 
devices at issue in Omnicare.  This may be due, in large part, to the 
Court of Chancery’s consistently narrow interpretation of the decision.  
Subsequent Delaware decisions reflect greater judicial deference to a 
board’s approval of deal protection devices, distinguishing and 
upholding strong combinations of deal protection devices such as the 
sign-and-consent structure even while acknowledging that the intent and 
practical effect of the devices was to lock-up the transaction.  Following 
these decisions, Omnicare has become, as a practical matter, of little to 
no import in the private merger context and rarely applicable in public 
mergers. 
Despite what many critics assert, however, Omnicare should not be 
dismissed as a case of bad facts making bad law or, based on its 
consistently narrow application, a historical footnote in the development 
of corporate law.  Indeed, such marginalization overlooks the impact of 
the majority’s opinion in shaping director decision-making in today’s 
corporate environment.  Omnicare has, in fact, had positive normative 
implications in advancing proper corporate governance standards as well 
as the policy of protecting stockholder interests.  The impact of the 
decision is not dependent on the vitality of the specific holdings or 
whether the decision can be easily avoided by creative contract drafting.  
Rather, it is the message underlying Omnicare that is important – 
conveying to directors, officers and lawyers the proper standards of 
managerial conduct in approving mergers and acquisitions. 
In this respect, it seems more appropriate to characterize Omnicare 
in a similar manner as scholars have for Smith v. Van Gorkom, as a 
normatively charged decision serving as part of an ongoing narrative of 
the Delaware courts trying to improve corporate governance by 
influencing director decision-making.  Several aspects of the majority’s 
opinion can be accurately viewed as shaping the definition and 
description of the norms of proper director conduct and conveying the 
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expectation of a higher standard of behavior, including a renewed 
attention to deal protection devices and the role of the fiduciary out, as 
well as director accountability for decisions regarding deal protection 
devices.  Also, in requiring a fiduciary out in all merger agreements the 
court preserved optionality in mergers and acquisitions and protected 
stockholder interests.  Finally, the court provided a precise rule 
regarding complete lock-ups for corporate actors to follow.  Thus, 
perhaps former Chancellor Allen’s description of Van Gorkom’s legacy 
can also be said to be applicable to Omnicare: 
I have to say that I think [Van Gorkom] was an important political and 
social success.  One of the greatest improvements in corporate law and 
governance over the last twenty years is the extent to which boards of 
directors are no longer passive and controlled as they were. . . . People 
most definitely took notice of its stern message.  From an ex-ante per-
spective, it almost certainly has had a positive effect on corporate gov-
ernance.  In this light, Van Gorkom, which, from a professional view, I 
think, is one of the worst cases in corporation law history, can be seen 
as one of the greatest opinions of modern corporation law.251 
251.  Allen, supra note 166, at 76. 
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